R.  C.  ROSE. 

JVo. 

n       •• 

LIBRARY 

0NWERSITY  Of 
CAUFORtM* 

SANOf€QO 


presented  to  the 

LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  •  SAN  DIEGO 

by 
FRIENDS  OF  THE  LIBRARY 


MR.    JOHN   H.    RO.SK 


donor 


A   THEORY   OF   CONDUCT 


A  THEORY  OF   CONDUCT 


BY 


ARCHIBALD   ALEXANDER 

FORMERLY  PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN 
COLUMBIA   COLLEGE 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 
1890 


Copyright,  1890, 
BY  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS. 

All  rights  reserved. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.  S.  A. 
Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  O.  Houghton  &  Company. 


CONTENTS. 

PAGB 

I.  INTRODUCTION i 

II.  THE  THEORY  OF  RIGHT    ...       20 

III.  THE  THEORY  OF  DUTY         .       .        .46 

IV.  THE  NATURE  OF  CHARACTER   .        .        58 
V.  THE  MOTIVE  TO  MORALITY  .  .80 


A   THEORY   OF  CONDUCT. 


I. 

Introduction. 

WITHIN  the  last  few  years  there  has 
been  an  unusual  interest  awakened  in 
moral  science.  The  causes  of  this  are  not 
hard  to  discover.  In  the  first  place,  the 
history  of  philosophy  shows  that  where  a 
decay  of  belief  in  the  popular  religion  is 
manifested  among  the  more  intellectual 
classes,  there  is  likely  to  be  a  demand  for 
something  to  take  the  place  of  the  popu- 
lar religion.  This  demand  is  usually  sup- 
plied by  systems  of  morality  which  are 
often  merely  dogmatic  guides  for  practi- 
cal life.  For  example,  the  philosophy  be- 
fore Socrates,  which  was  chiefly  physical, 


2  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

and  the  philosophy  of  the  Socratic  period, 
which  was  mainly  metaphysical,  were  fol- 
lowed by  the  very  practical  systems  of  the 
Stoics,  the  Epicureans,  and  Skeptics,  who 
sought  to  solve  the  problem  of  life  and  to 
present  a  philosophy  of  character.  The 
systematic  philosophy  which  supplanted 
the  mythology  of  Greece,  the  popular 
creeds  associated  with  the  Olympian  gods, 
had  in  some  cases  silenced  the  oracles,  in 
others  aroused  doubts  as  to  the  reality  of 
the  heroic  and  dramatic  figures  of  Homer 
and  ^Eschylus.  The  Theogony  of  Hesiod 
was  at  length  received  with  incredulity  in 
later  times,  and  new  shrines  and  forms 
of  worship  had  to  be  constructed  to  take 
the  place  of  those  which  no  longer  at- 
tracted their  devotees.  Just  as  the  pre- 
Sophistic  thinkers  had  rested  unsatisfied 
with  a  mythological  explanation  of  Na- 
ture, and  had  set  forth  a  science  of  the 
elements  or  an  atomic  theory  ;  so  the 
post-Aristotelian  thinkers  looked  askance 
at  oracles  and  auguries,  and  applied,  ac- 


Introduction.  3 

cording  to  their  lights,  the  methods  of 
science  to  the  conduct  of  men.  It  may 
indeed  be  said  that  the  successful  ad- 
vance of  Christianity  was  due  in  some 
measure  to  the  fact  that  the  Stoic  and 
Epicurean  had  taught  in  vain.  The  gos- 
pel addressed  to  the  "weary  and  heavy 
laden  "  spoke  to  the  jaded  minds  of  those 
whose  religion  had  lost  its  life,  whose  phi- 
losophy was  insufficient. 

During  the  Patristic  and  Scholastic 
ages,  when  the  Church  supplied  the  rule 
of  human  conduct,  and  enforced  its  de- 
crees through  the  spiritual  direction  of 
the  priesthood  or  the  force  of  the  civil 
authority,  there  was  but  little  disposition 
toward  original  ethical  inquiry.  But  with 
the  religious  doubts  excited  at  the  time 
of  the  Reformation  came  inquiries  as  to 
the  application  of  the  Christian  code  of 
morals ;  and  the  seventeenth  century  is 
noted  for  the  thorough  and  able  discus- 
sions of  the  Jesuits  and  other  learned  writ- 
ers on  practical  ethics.  The  writings  of 


4  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

the  Spanish  and  French  casuists  furnish 
a  striking  example  of  an  attempt  to  place 
on  a  more  rational  foundation  rules  of  ac- 
tion prescribed  by  the  Church,  but  sub- 
jected to  the  criticism  of  the  unbeliever. 

Ethical  reaction  in  a  different  form  is 
illustrated  by  the  moral  science  of  Ger- 
many during  the  latter  half  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century.  The  dogmatic  philoso- 
phy which  culminated  in  the  system  of 
Wolff  did  not  set  forth  any  original  doc- 
trine of  ethics.  We  must  of  course  ex- 
cept Spinoza  in  making  this  general  state- 
ment. But  when  the  period  of  the  Auf- 
kldrung  came,  and  with  it  the  skepticism 
with  regard  to  ecclesiastical  claims  and 
Scriptural  authority,  there  was  a  tendency 
on  the  part  of  many  to  look  for  princi- 
ples of  action  independent  of  Revelation. 
Until  the  publication  of  Kant's  ethical 
treatises,  some  were  disposed  to  borrow 
from  abroad  what  they  did  not  find  at 
home.  The  Critique  of  Practical  Reason 
cannot  be  well  understood  unless  it  is  re- 


Introduction.  5 

membered  that  the  sentimental  ethics  of 
Scotland  and  the  sensualistic  ethics  of 
France  had  found  a  place  in  many  Ger- 
man minds.  The  ethical  development  in 
France,  just  before  the  revolution,  was  it- 
self partly  a  reaction  against  the  ecclesi- 
asticism  which  Voltaire  and  some  of  his 
contemporaries  had  so  vigorously  and  in- 
sidiously attacked. 

Analogous  to  such  reactionary  changes 
is  the  ethical  movement  in  Great  Britain 
and  Germany  at  the  present  time.  It  is 
not  that  this  age  is  generally  over-skep- 
tical. On  the  contrary,  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  there  was  ever  a  time  when  the 
great  mass  of  the  people  in  Europe  and 
America  were  so  effectively  interested  in 
religious  affairs.  This  is  shown  in  many 
ways,  —  by  financial  expenditure,  by  sta- 
tistics as  to  the  increased  membership  of 
orthodox  communions,  by  energy  in  the 
support  of  missions,  by  a  high  class  of  re- 
ligious literature,  and  in  some  countries 
by  a  considerable  improvement  in  moral 


6  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

conduct.  But  among  men  of  science  and 
letters,  among  the  learned  and  intellect- 
ual classes,  there  is  a  very  large  number 
of  people  who  have  lost  either  wholly  or 
in  part  their  faith  in  revealed  religion. 
There  are  many,  for  example,  who  would 
not  be  willing  to  follow  Hume's  rigorous 
logic,  but  are  quite  ready  to  pursue  the 
middle  way  of  Agnosticism.  There  are 
many  who  admire  the  Old  Testament  for 
its  literary  qualities,  and  the  New  Testa- 
ment for  its  gracious  teachings,  but  who 
refuse  to  accept  the  book  of  Genesis  as 
a  true  account  of  the  world's  beginning, 
and  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  as  a  code 
of  action.  Whether  the  doctrine  of  Evo- 
lution has  been  demonstrated  to  be  true 
or  not,  —  whether  it  can  be  reconciled 
with  the  traditional  creed  or  not,  —  one 
thing  seems  to  be  quite  certain :  the  gen- 
eral effect  of  the  teachings  of  that  the- 
ory has  been  prejudicial  to  religion,  in 
making  men  disregard  the  authority  of  the 
Church.  This  has  of  course  been  due,  to 


Introduction.  7 

a  very  great  extent,  to  the  ignorance  and 
imprudence  of  many  who  have  had  reli- 
gious zeal,  but  little  scientific  knowledge. 
How  far  men  are  justified  in  losing  faith 
in  revealed  religion  in  so  far  as  they  ac- 
quire scientific  knowledge  is  not  to  be 
considered  here.  What  must  be  consid- 
ered is  this,  that  the  advance  of  natural 
science  by  the  aid  of  the  evolution-theory 
has  been  extraordinary,  and  has  produced 
a  reaction  in  many  minds  against  what  is 
often  called  Orthodoxy.  This  condition 
of  affairs  has  been  aggravated  by  the  de- 
velopment of  that  historical  school  which 
can  trace  its  lineage  to  Spinoza,  and  which 
in  this  century  has  found  its  most  radical 
representatives  at  Tubingen.  In  its  mod- 
ified form  it  has  sympathizers  in  some 
Protestant  theological  seminaries.  It  has 
the  same  kind  of  respect  for  the  Bible  that 
Luther  had  for  the  Pope.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary to  estimate  here  the  value  of  its 
labors ;  it  is  important  to  notice  that  the 
effect  of  its  teaching  has  been  to  lessen 


8  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

the  authority  and  influence  of  Revelation, 
and  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  Rea- 
son. There  are  no  longer  open  enemies 
to  Christianity  as  able  as  Voltaire  and 
Hume  and  the  doubters  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  But  quite  as  effective  opposi- 
tion to  the  supremacy  of  Revelation  in 
matters  of  faith  can  be  maintained  by 
men  who  have  taken  their  degree  in  Di- 
vinity. While  it  is  possible,  and  may  be 
logical,  to  reject  as  unworthy  of  belief 
certain  parts  of  the  teaching  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, and  yet  hold  that  in  them  is  to  be 
found  the  essence  of  ethical  doctrine,  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  rejection  of  any 
part  of  Revelation  on  rational  grounds  in- 
volves the  establishment  of  a  principle  on 
which  such  rejection  is  made.  If  the  re- 
jected doctrine  be  ethical,  and  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  it  is  rejected  ethical,  it 
follows  that  so  far  Revelation  and  ethics 
are  independent.  The  spread  of  Agnos- 
ticism and  of  belief  in  the  theory  of  Ev- 
olution has  had  a  positive  as  well  as  a 


Introduction.  9 

negative  effect  in  the  realm  of  ethics. 
It  is  not  merely  that  unbelief  in  Revela- 
tion has  been  caused  by  these  doctrines ; 
it  is  that  they  have  furnished  a  founda- 
tion for  ethical  systems  which  are  held  to 
be  in  contradiction  to  those  of  revealed 
religion.  It  is  natural,  therefore,  that 
those  who  have  been  led  to  doubt  that 
which  has  been  "  revealed  "  should  be  will- 
ing to  accept  the  logical  conclusions  of 
that  which  has  given  rise  to  the  doubt. 

It  may  be  asked,  however,  Cannot  one 
who  believes  in  the  possibility  of  a  ra- 
tional system  of  ethics  be  at  the  same 
time  a  believer  in  the  ethics  of  Revela- 
tion ?  Is  it  not  possible  that  the  conclu- 
sions of  science  and  those  of  religion  will 
be  found  to  coincide  ?  It  may  be  held 
that  the  ethical  doctrine  founded  on  Rea- 
son is  in  reality  a  vindication  of  the  eth- 
ics of  Revelation,  or  conversely  that  Rev- 
elation confirms  what  Reason  finds  to  be 
true.  This  point  will  command  our  atten- 
tion elsewhere,  and  the  apparent  opposi- 


10  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

tion  beween  Reason  and  Revelation  will 
be  noticed.  For  the  present  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  say  that  the  ethics  of  Revelation 
must  be  absolute,  so  that  a  criticism  of 
such  ethics  from  a  rational  point  of  view 
will  be  in  part  a  criticism  of  what  is  called 
the  theory  of  absolute  right,  or  Intuition- 
alism. 

A  glance  at  the  number  of  important 
works  on  moral  science  which  have  lately 
appeared  will,  we  believe,  justify  the  propo- 
sitions stated  above.  The  history  of  Eng- 
lish ethics  during  the  nineteenth  century 
gives  a  sufficient  proof.  The  spread  of 
what  is  popularly  known  as  the  utilitarian 
theory  is  usually  attributed  to  Jeremy  Ben- 
tham  and  his  followers,  but  the  theory  is 
as  old  as  systematic  ethics  themselves.  It 
was  Bentham  who  first  stated  it  boldly.1 
It  was  found  in  a  more  or  less  explicit 
form  in  the  doctrines  of  Hobbes  and 
Hutcheson. 

The  theory  of  the  earlier  Epicureans  is 
1  Vol.  v.  p.  20. 


Introduction.  // 

a  form  of  utilitarianism.  Socrates  and 
Plato  in  their  doctrine  that  the  General 
Good  was  the  ethical  end  were  stating  the 
principle  of  utilitarianism  in  a  partial  and 
illogical  way ;  although  Aristotle's  view 
of  happiness  as  something  objective  can 
hardly  be  classified  with  the  doctrines  of 
the  school.  According  to  Socrates  and 
to  Plato  virtue  is  knowledge  of  the  good. 
Socrates  called  it  the  chief  good — Plato 
more  often,  the  ideal  good ;  but  the  essence 
of  the  good  was  its  utility.  This  appears 
distinctly  in  more  than  one  of  the  Platonic 
dialogues,  but  is  directly  contradicted  in 
others.  The  utilitarian  theory  is  a  logical 
result  of  empiricism,  so  that  John  Stuart 
Mill's  ethics  was  a  proper  consequence  of 
his  psychology  as  well  as  a  modified  form 
of  Bentham's  cynical  teachings.  When 
Darwin's  theory  of  species  and  develop- 
ment had  been  followed  by  his  crude  sug- 
gestions as  to  moral  doctrine,  when  Her- 
bert Spencer  had  shown  implicitly  by  the 
principles  of  his  Philosophy  and  Psychol- 


12  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

ogy  that  those  who  accepted  his  teaching 
must  build  up  a  new  system  of  ethics, 
there  was  a  natural  tendency  toward  an 
ethical  reaction.  Accordingly  we  find  pub- 
lished in  rapid  succession  treatises  dealing 
with  all  sides  of  the  ethical  problem :  ju- 
dicial works  like  that  of  Professor  Sidg- 
wick,  orthodox  and  conservative  works  like 
that  of  Dr.  Martineau,  evolutionary  works 
like  those  of  Mr.  Spencer  and  Mr.  Leslie 
Stephen,  works  imbued  with  the  spirit  and 
method  of  the  absolute  philosophy  like 
those  of  Mr.  Bradley  and  Mr.  Green.  It 
is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  writings 
just  referred  to  are  the  most  valuable  con- 
tributions to  the  literature  of  ethical  sci- 
ence which  this  century  has  produced. 
Some  of  them  have  been  expressions  of 
radical  doctrine,  while  some  owe  their  ori- 
gin to  the  controversy  which  that  radical 
doctrine  has  excited.  Those  which  bear 
distinctly  the  marks  of  German  thought 
have  been  more  or  less  inspired  by  the 
teaching  of  Fichte  and  Hegel. 


Introduction.  13 

It  is  my  purpose  to  discuss  as  concisely 
as  possible  some  of  the  more  important 
principles  which  are  the  foundation  of  all  ' 
moral  science,  and  it  is  my  hope  that  I 
may  be  able  in  setting  aside  much  that 
is  false,  to  arrive  at  conclusions  which  are 
beyond  doubt.  It  is  also  my  purpose 
to  notice  briefly  the  harmony  of  moral 
science  and  revealed  religion.  Moral 
conduct  involves  generally  two  things  : 
i.  A  standard  of  Morality.  2.  Volition. 
Where  the  volition  is  in  agreement  with 
the  standard  the  action  is  moral  or  right. 
Where  it  is  in  disagreement,  the  action  is 
immoral  or  wrong.  There  are  indifferent 
actions,  however,  but  these  are  in  reality 
right  actions.  The  test  of  an  indifferent 
action  is  not  that  its  performance  is  not 
wrong,  but  that  its  non-performance  is  as 
right  as  its  performance.  It  will  be  ad- 
mitted on  all  sides  that,  if  there  be  a  moral 
science,  there  must  be  a  moral  standard. 
This  standard  may  or  may  not  be  absolute 
and  ultimate.  If  it  be  absolute  and  ulti- 


14  A  neory  of  Conduct. 

mate  it  is  unnecessary  to  analyze  it  or  to 
attempt  its  analysis  into  simple  elements. 
If  it  be  neither  absolute  nor  ultimate,  one 
has  a  right  to  inquire  what  its  nature  may 
be.  One  has  a  right  to  ask  what  makes  the 
standard  of  right.  It  is  possible  to  explain 
without  analyzing  even  an  absolute  stand- 
ard. For  example,  without  attempting  to 
unfold  the  nature  of  Tightness,  one  may 
say  that  the  standard  is  fixed  by  an  author- 
ity such  as  the  will  of  God ;  or  by  an  im- 
mutable principle  according  to  which  God 
directs  his  will  and  wills  that  man  should 
act.  But  in  these  cases  there  is  no  higher 
court  to  which  appeal  can  be  made.  The 
question  Why  is  this  absolutely  right  ?  can 
be  answered  only  by  saying,  Because  God 
wills  it  or  because  it  is  in  agreement  with 
an  immutable  principle.  Refuge  cannot  be 
taken  in  the  proposition  that  right  is  what 
is  in  accordance  with  the  "  eternal  fitness 
of  things,"  for  the  term  "fitness  "  becomes 
the  object  of  inquiry,  and  fitness  must 
mean  Tightness  or  else  the  principle  of 
Right  is  not  absolute  and  ultimate. 


Introduction.  /5 

But  the  standard  of  morality  may  be  re- 
garded as  something  relative  or  derived. 
It  may  be  said  that  right  actions  are  right 
because  they  are  beneficent,  because  they 
tend  to  improve  the  condition  of  society, 
to  advance  its  interests,  and  so  to  promote 
its  happiness.  It  may  be  said  that  right- 
ness  will  then  vary  according  to  the  con- 
ditions of  society,  so  that  what  is  right 
under  some  circumstances  may  be  wrong 
under  others.  Morality  from  such  a  point 
of  view  has  no  absolute  meaning,  and  may 
be  shown  to  be  derived  from  certain  non- 
moral  principles,  such  as  sentiment,  self- 
love,  or  custom  and  habit.  It  is  the  prob- 
lem of  the  scientific  moralist  who  rejects 
the  theory  of  an  absolute  right  to  explain 
the  meaning  and  derivation  of  the  relative 
right  which  is  the  standard  of  Moral  Ac- 
tion. This  makes  a  large  part  of  moral 
inquiry  an  analysis  of  the  term  "ought." 
We  ought  to  do  what  is  right  ?  Right  is 
what  we  ought  to  do.  What  ought  to  be 
done  is  a  question  which  can  be  answered 


1 6  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

in  two  general  ways.  It  may  be  said  the 
right  ought  to  be  done,  and  the  right  is 
ultimate ;  or  the  right  ought  to  be  done, 
right  being  that  which  derives  its  right- 
ness  from  certain  consequences. 

If  a  conclusion  be  reached  as  to  the 
nature  of  right,  one  is  forced  to  inquire, 
How  can  that  which  is  right  be  known  ? 
Is  right  correlate  with  knowledge,  or  with 
feeling,  or  with  both  ?  Is  right  something 
of  which  I  become  aware  by  the  rise  of 
certain  emotions,  or  is  its  reality  deter- 
mined by  an  act  of  knowledge,  or  do  both 
knowledge  and  emotion  combine  to  inform 
me  ?  Several  answers  to  these  questions 
have  been  given.  For  the  present  I  may 
leave  the  subject  to  consider  generally  the 
second  main  object  of  ethical  inquiry  which 
is  volition.  Every  moral  action  is  volun- 
tary. But  every  act  of  volition  is  complex. 
It  implies  a  motive  according  to  which  the 
volition  is  made.  It  implies  the  action  of 
the  will  itself,  and  the  end  of  the  action. 
As  it  will  be  necessary  hereafter  to  dis- 


Introduction,  17 

cuss  the  exact  relation  of  the  motive  to 
the  will,  it  is  well  here  to  define  the  terms 
just  used. 

The  motive  may  be  said  to  consist 
of  that  state  of  mind  which  is  the  imme- 
diate occasion  of  the  will's  acting  in  a  cer- 
tain way.  It  will  be  found  that  every  act 
of  the  will  involves  an  act  of  knowledge 
and  a  desire.  The  act  of  knowledge  causes 
the  desire.  Two  men  may  each  have  the 
same  knowledge  at  a  given  moment,  yet 
the  desires  awakened  by  such  knowledge 
may  be  different.  Motive,  therefore,  should 
properly  comprehend  not  merely  the  know- 
ledge and  the  desire,  but  what  is  called 
character.  It  is  customary,  however,  to 
regard  the  character  as  independent,  and 
to  confine  the  term  "  motive "  to  some  im- 
pulse, or  affection,  or  desire.  But  it  will 
be  seen  that  this  obscures  the  important 
fact  that  the  impulse  or  desire  is  so  closely 
connected  with  the  character  of  the  per- 
son who  wills,  that  the  direction  of  the 
will  in  most  cases  may  be  said  to  depend 


i8  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

on  the  character.  This  may  be  explained 
by  an  illustration.  Here  are  two  men,  A. 
and  B.  To  follow  a  certain  course  of  ac- 
tion is  suggested  by  worldly  considera- 
tions, such  as  ambition,  enjoyment  of  ease, 
love  of  power.  The  same  course  of  action 
lies  open  to  each ;  the  same  object  ap- 
peals to  each.  In  the  case  of  A.  the  mo- 
tive of  ambition  is  stronger  than  the  mo- 
tive to  do  right.  Why  is  this  ?  The  only 
explanation  to  be  found  is  in  A.'s  char- 
acter; for  the  same  object  is  before  B. 
The  motives  so  called  are  not  real  mo- 
tives, but  only  tendencies.  B.  prefers  to 
follow  a  moral  course  of  action,  because 
his  desire  to  be  moral  is  stronger  than 
other  desires.  And  why  ?  The  only  ex- 
planation to  be  found  is  in  B.'s  character. 
It  will  be  suspected  by  some  that  this  is 
urged  to  support  a  doctrine  of  the  Free- 
dom of  the  Will ;  but  a  later  chapter  will 
doubtless  dispel  such  an  impression.  The 
end  of  voluntary  action  is  not  the  motive, 
but  usually  excites  the  desire  which  moves 


Introduction.  19 

the  will.  These  general  suggestions  I  have 
made  before  beginning  an  analysis  of  moral 
principles. 

The  importance  of  such  an  analysis  as 
I  have  just  suggested  is  self-evident.  It 
has  been  often  observed  that  false  mo- 
rality —  that  is,  morality  founded  on  false 
principles  —  is  more  dangerous  than  ac- 
tual immorality.  The  justification,  on  sup- 
posed moral  principles,  of  wrong  actions, 
is  far  more  dangerous  to  the  individual 
and  to  society  than  the  performance  of 
immoral  actions  which  are  admitted  or  rec- 
ognized as  such.  And  it  may  be  learned 
from  history  how  often  false  systems  of 
ethics  have  first  corrupted  society  and 

% 

then  led  it  to  martyrdom. 


II. 

The  Theory  of  Right. 

Two  distinct  questions  present  them- 
selves in  connection  with  the  theory  of 
right,  which  I  shall  now  attempt  to  an- 
swer :  — 

1.  What  is  the  nature  of  right? 

2.  How   is   right  known  ? 

It  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  the  ety- 
mology of  the  term.  Right  is  the  contra- 
dictory of  wrong,  but  is  not  the  contra- 
dictory of  bad.  Right  is  what  is  morally 
good.  The  great  fault  of  ancient  ethics, 
and  of  a  great  part  of  modern  ethics,  as 
many  know,  consists  in  the  failure  to  dis- 
tinguish between  what  is  right  and  what 
is  good.  The  dialogues  of  Plato  abound 
in  examples  of  this  confusion.  The  pun- 
ishment of  a  criminal,  for  example,  may  in 
some  instances  be  bad  for  him.  It  may 


The  Theory  of  Right.  21 

cause  him  pain.  It  may  harden  instead 
of  reforming  him.  It  may  put  his  family 
in  distress.  The  Tightness  of  punishing 
him  depends  on  some  legal,  and  ultimately 
on  some  moral  principle. 

What  the  nature  of  this  principle  is 
forms  a  most  important  question  in  eth- 
ics. The  theory  which  is  ordinarily  called 
the  theory  of  consequences  makes  the  mo- 
rality of  conduct  depend  primarily  on  the 
results  of  conduct.  The  result  of  moral 
conduct  is  happiness.  The  result  of  im- 
moral conduct  is  unhappiness.  There  is 
a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  extent 
of  happiness  or  unhappiness  so  involved. 
According  to  some  it  is  the  happiness  or 
unhappiness  of  self  which  is  in  question ; 
according  to  others  it  is  the  happiness  of 
others.  In  one  case  we  have  what  is 
known  as  Egoism  ;  in  the  other  what  is 
known  as  Altruism.  The  theories  are 
often  described  as  egoistic  and  altruis- 
tic Hedonism.  In  both  of  them  morality 
is  primarily  objective.  The  result,  not 


22  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

the  motive,  of  conduct  must  be  considered 
in  order  that  the  morality  of  the  conduct 
may  be  estimated.  To  murder  a  man  is 
wrong,  because  murder  results  in  unhap- 
piness ;  and  so  murderous  motives  are 
wrong,  because  they  tend  to  cause  mur- 
derous conduct.  If  happiness  were  the 
result  of  murderous  conduct,  and  if  un- 
happiness  were  produced  by  not  murder- 
ing, then  murder  would  be  right  and  mur- 
derous motives  would  be  right.  To  take 
human  life  in  order  to  promote  my  own 
happiness  is  to  act  morally  if  I  am  an 
Egoist.  To  take  it  in  order  to  promote 
the  happiness  of  others  is  to  act  morally 
if  I  am  an  Altruist.  In  this  way  it  is  ar- 
gued that  the  execution  of  criminals,  the 
taking  of  life  in  war,  the  taking  of  life  in 
self-defense,  are  actions  which  cannot  be 
judged  of  per  se,  but  are  to  be  judged 
from  the  amount  of  happiness  or  unhap- 
piness  which  results  from  them. 

From  this  point  of  view,  in  judging  of 
conduct,  the  motive  has  a  moral  value  only 


The  Theory  of  Right.  23 

in  so  far  as  it  influences,  or  tends  to  in- 
fluence, the  action.  If  I  perform  a  be- 
nevolent action  from  motives  of  vanity,  and 
that  action  is  conducive  to  happiness,  then 
my  conduct  is  moral.  It  cannot,  accord- 
ing to  our  premises,  be  said  that  the  mo- 
tive is  immoral  because  the  consequences 
of  the  act  produce  happiness,  and  the 
motives  of  vanity  produce,  and  tend  to 
produce,  the  act.  If  it  be  said  that  such 
motives  are  moral  in  so  far  as  they  produce 
beneficent  acts,  but  are  immoral  because 
they  injure  the  character  and  corrupt  so- 
ciety, it  follows  that  our  definition  of  con- 
duct must  be  modified,  —  that  it  includes 
something  more  than  motive,  act,  and  end. 
According  to  the  theory  of  conse- 
quences, the  performance  of  an  action 
detrimental  to  the  happiness  of  self  or  of 
others  is  immoral,  no  matter  what  the 
character  of  the  motive  may  be.  It  is  no 
justification,  then,  of  murder,  or  theft,  or 
any  interference  with  happiness,  that  it  is 
committed  with  a  good  motive.  However 


24  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

good  and  pure  the  motive  may  be,  the 
consequences  of  its  influence  are  the  tests 
of  the  moral  conduct  which  it  affects. 

The  other  general  theory  opposed  to 
that  of  consequences  is  the  theory  that 
the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  actions 
is  to  be  judged  primarily  by  the  motive, 
and  only  secondarily  by  the  consequences. 
It  is  said  fiat  justitia  mat  cesium.  Now  it 
would  manifestly  be  a  most  unhappy  con- 
dition of  affairs  were  the  heavens  to  fall. 
According  to  the  advocate  of  the  theory 
of  consequences,  it  would  be  plain  that 
justice  had  not  been  done  were  the  catas- 
trophe to  happen.  But  to  one  who  adopts 
the  doctrine  that  the  consequences  are  not 
the  primary  tests  of  moral  conduct,  it  is 
quite  possible  that  there  should  be  un- 
happy consequences  following  a  course  of 
moral  conduct.  It  may  be  remarked,  how- 
ever, that  this  pessimistic  view  is  rare, 
and  the  position  of  Kant  is  ordinarily 
taken  that  there  is  an  agreement  between 
morality  and  happiness,  so  that  to  follow 


The  Theory  of  Right.  25 

the  one  insures  the  other.  If  this  view 
of  what  may  be  called  intrinsic  morality 
be  adopted,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as 
casuistry.  It  can  never  be  right  to  lie, 
because  lying  is  intrinsically  wrong.  If  it 
be  said  there  are  circumstances  in  which 
lying  is  right,  there  are  occasions  in  which 
doing  wrong  is  justified,  and  becomes  right 
by  reason  of  the  consequences,  then  we 
abandon  the  position  just  referred  to,  and 
are  taking  up  the  theory  of  consequences. 
There  are  very  few  men  in  our  time,  how- 
ever, who  are  willing  to  follow  this  the- 
ory of  right  to  its  logical  conclusions. 
Those  who  do  so  are  usually  looked  upon 
as  foolish  or  fanatical,  while  the  social 
and  legal  sanctions  are  here  in  disagree- 
ment with  the  moral  sanction. 

For  if  the  consequences  justify  the  sup- 
posed bad  action,  it  is  impossible  to  deny 
that  the  more  serious  the  consequences 
anticipated  from  doing  right,  the  more  in- 
advisable it  becomes  that  the  right  should 
be  done.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  stand- 


26  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

ard  of  right  would  then  vary  with  the  esti- 
mate made  by  moral  agents  as  to  the  prob- 
able consequences. 

In  looking  generally  at  these  two  the- 
ories of  right,  it  must  be  affirmed,  with 
Bentham,  that  happiness  is  the  end  of  all 
human  action.  It  is  the  prime  motive. 
It  is  generally  admitted  that  the  conduct 
of  all  men  is  consciously  directed  toward 
the  attainment  of  happiness.  One  may 
go  further  and  say  that  the  conduct  of 
each  man  is  naturally  directed  toward  the 
attainment  of  his  own  happiness.  This 
proposition  is  different  from  the  proposi- 
tion that  each  man  ought  so  to  direct  his 
conduct.  The  selfishness  which,  accord- 
ing to  writers  like  Hobbes,  and  La  Roche- 
foucauld, and  Helvetius,  is  the  spring  of 
all  action  is  so  common  that  it  has  led 
many  to  confound  what  is  with  what  ought 
to  be.  If  morality  were  something  which 
would  bring  unhappiness,  and  if  the  road 
to  happiness  were  the  pursuit  of  immoral 
ends,  no  man  would  care  to  do  what  is 


The  Theory  of  Right.  27 

right.  What  does  it  signify  that  I  break 
every  rule  of  morality  provided  that  I  am 
happier  from  so  doing?  If  you  say  you 
may  be  happy  now,  but  eventually  pain 
and  remorse  will  take  the  place  of  your 
present  enjoyment,  you  contradict  the 
proposition  with  which  we  set  out.  We 
are  accustomed  to  say  that  "in  the  end" 
a  virtuous  course  of  conduct  will  bring 
happiness.  We  endure  present  pains  or 
inconveniences,  we  make  present  self-sac- 
rifices, as  means  to  the  furtherance  of 
future  and  permanent  happiness.  Even 
those  who  sacrifice  health,  or  life,  or  for- 
tune for  others  —  even  martyrs  who  have 
forsaken  a  life  of  ease,  and  who  have  lan- 
guished in  prisons  or  burned  at  the  stake 
—  have  had  their  eyes  fixed  on  an  eter- 
nity of  joy  which  would  be  lost  to  them 
were  they  not  to  welcome  the  immediate 
pain.  I  affirm,  then,  that  if  there  be  dis- 
agreement between  happiness  and  mo- 
rality, it  is  useless  to  attempt  to  persuade 
men  to  be  moral.  If  a  man  be  persuaded 


28  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

that  adultery,  and  murder,  and  theft  are 
the  means  to  eternal  happiness,  he  will 
follow  them  in  spite  of  any  immutable  prin- 
ciple or  the  still  small  voice  of  conscience. 
It  is  useless  to  tell  such  a  man  of  the 
beauty  of  virtue,  of  the  nobility  of  self- 
sacrifice,  of  the  intrinsic  Tightness  of  gen- 
erosity and  kindness,  if  he  believes  that 
the  exercise  of  such  qualities  will  make 
him  unhappy  ;  then  he  will  prefer  happi- 
ness to  virtue,  whether  he  be  a  sinner  or 
a  saint.  But,  as  I  said  above,  there  are 
few  who  take  so  pessimistic  a  view,  and 
men  have  been  accustomed  to  regard  vir- 
tuous conduct  as  the  means  to  the  high- 
est and  most  permanent  happiness.  So 
close  has  this  identification  of  the  two  be- 
come, that  one  school  of  morals  affirms 
the  test  of  moral  conduct  to  be  the  quan- 
tity of  happiness  which  it  brings.  The 
most  logical  supporters  of  this  theory  con- 
sider that  the  conduct  which  we  should 
call  moral  is  that  which  produces  the  max- 
imum of  happiness,  irrespective  of  the 


The  Theory  of  Right.  29 

quality  of  that  happiness  ;  and,  conversely, 
immoral  conduct  tends  to  produce  unhap- 
piness.  The  only  reason  why  one  kind  of 
happiness  should  be  sought  rather  than 
another  (in  so  far  as  the  ethical  aspect  of 
the  matter  is  concerned)  is  on  account  of 
its  greater  intensity  or  more  enduring 
character.  As  soon  as  we  admit  a  differ- 
ence in  the  quality  of  pleasures,  the  theory 
of  "  happiness  "  as  the  test  of  morality  is 
abandoned.  All  pleasures  must  be  re- 
garded as  having  the  same  ethical  value. 
This  was  the  position  taken  by  Bentham, 
and  its  modification  by  John  Stuart  Mill 
was  inconsistent  with  the  latter's  utili- 
tarianism. For  as  soon  as  we  admit  a 
difference  of  moral  quality  in  different 
kinds  of  happiness,  we  are  obliged  to  ask 
why  one  kind  is  more  moral  than  another, 
and  thus  set  up  a  standard  of  morality 
other  than  the  utilitarian.  We  have  no 
right,  then,  to  say  that  the  pleasure  of  a 
man  who  is  enjoying  the  delight  of  good 
eating  and  drinking  is  morally  inferior  to 


jo  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

that  of  a  man  whose  philanthropic  soul 
is  elated  at  seeing  paupers  warmed,  and 
clothed,  and  fed,  unless  it  can  be  shown 
that  the  latter  pleasure  is  more  intense  or 
more  lasting  than  the  first.  Both  inten- 
sity and  permanence  depend,  as  will  be 
seen,  very  largely  on  the  character  of  the 
man. 

The  prevailing  tendency  in  the  field  of 
ethics  is  to  reject  Egoism  and  to  advo- 
cate the  altruistic  theory.  Moral  conduct 
is  that  which  produces  the  greatest  hap- 
piness, not  of  self  alone,  but  of  the  great- 
est number.  What  has  been  said  above, 
however,  with  regard  to  the  possible  dis- 
agreement of  happiness  and  moral  con- 
duct is  applicable  here.  It  is  impossible 
to  persuade  men  to  seek  after  the  happi- 
ness of  others  unless  they  are  convinced 
that  such  conduct  will  secure  their  own 
happiness.  An  amiable  man  is  one  who 
derives  happiness  in  viewing  the  welfare 
of  others ;  a  malevolent  man  is  one  who 
does  not.  It  is  important,  therefore,  to 


The  Theory  of  Right.  31 

remember  that  altruism  cannot  per  se  be 
a  theory  of  morals  which  is  practically 
valid,  unless  it  be  dependent  on  a  theory 
of  egoism.  For  example,  I  say  to  Mr. 
A.  :  Do  what  is  right.  He  asks,  What 
is  right  ?  I  reply,  Act  so  as  to  secure 
the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number.  He  may  answer,  But  why  should 
I  do  that  ?  Now  if  I  say,  Because  it  is 
a  law  of  God,  or  a  law  of  conscience,  or 
according  to  the  eternal  fitness  of  things, 
that  you  should  so  act,  it  is  apparent  that 
I  abandon  my  theory  of  utilitarianism.  If 
I  say,  Your  nature  is  benevolent  enough 
to  answer  your  question,  Mr.  A.  may  say 
to  me,  —  thereby  showing  a  most  unpleas- 
ant side  of  his  character,  —  I  am  not  a 
benevolent  man.  I  do  not  care  what  be- 
comes of  society  so  long  as  I  am  happy 
myself.  The  happiness  of  society,  or  what 
is  often  called  the  social  organism,  is  the 
happiness  of  a  collection  of  men.  Some 
of  them  Mr.  A.  may  care  a  great  deal 
about :  if  he  cares  enough  about  them  to 


$2  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

sacrifice  his  own  happiness  to  theirs,  he 
doubtless  finds  a  recompense  for  his  self- 
denial.  It  is  irrelevant  to  say  that  he 
has,  by  his  self-denial,  set  aside  his  own 
happiness.  The  fact  that  he  acts  as  he 
does  shows  that  he  contemplates  greater 
happiness  from  his  action  than  if  he  re- 
frained and  enjoyed  immediate  happiness. 
This  aspect  of  conduct  will  be  noticed 
more  fully  when  the  reasons  why  one 
should  be  moral  are  discussed.  I  am  dis- 
posed to  emphasize  this  relation  which  ex- 
ists between  Egoism  and  Altruism.  For 
it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  advocates  of 
the  latter,  as  well  as  those  who  deny  both 
Egoism  and  Altruism,  have  encouraged 
what  one  might  almost  describe  as  hypoc- 
risy in  their  dealing  with  the  motives  of 
conduct.  A  man  who  conducts  his  ac- 
tions in  order  to  promote  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number  would 
not  do  so  unless  he  believed  that  such 
conduct  would  promote  his  own  happi- 
ness. Such  a  course  of  action  may  give 


The  Theory  of  Right.  33 

him  immediate  pain,  and  may  involve  the 
suffering  on  his  part  of  future  pain  ;  but 
unless  he  believed  that  it  would  insure 
him  on  the  whole  a  greater  amount  of 
pleasure  than  of  pain,  he  would  not  seek 
the  happiness  of  others  at  the  expense  of 
his  own  happiness.  It  is  indeed  difficult 
to  understand  why  the  term  self-denial 
should  be  applied  to  conduct  which  gives 
up  immediate  pleasure  for  the  sake  of 
pleasure  in  the  future.  To  gratify  one's 
desire  to  be  benevolent,  to  act  according 
to  the  sympathies  of  one's  nature,  to  sat- 
isfy the  intense  longing  that  a  man  has 
to  do  good  to  those  whom  he  loves,  is 
not,  scientifically  speaking,  self-denial  at 
all.  If  I  am  a  Sybarite,  self-denial  does 
not  consist  in  preferring  ease  and  the  en- 
joyment of  the  good  things  of  this  life  to 
sacrifice  of  these  things  for  others.  But 
if  I  am  born  with  what  men  call  a  great 
and  unselfish  heart,  if  I  am  of  a  sympa- 
thetic nature,  if  I  feel  remorse  and  shame 
at  neglecting  the  happiness  of  others,  even 


34  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

though  I  love  the  immediate  pleasures  of 
life,  I  shall  be  a  Sybarite  unless  I  desire 
to  benefit  others.  The  act  of  benefiting 
others  is  clearly  a  following  of  my  own 
interest.  It  is  not  self-denial.  What  the 
immediate  gratification  of  the  appetites  is 
to  the  Sybarite,  the  furtherance  of  the 
welfare  of  others  is  to  the  benevolent 
man. 

It  would  appear  from  what  has  been  said, 
then,  that  I  am  identifying  moral  conduct 
with  conduct  in  the  interest  of  self,  but 
this  is  not  strictly  true.  It  is  one  thing  to 
say  that  all  moral  conduct  promotes  the 
happiness  of  self.  One  may  go  further 
and  affirm  that  moral  conduct  is  followed 
because  it  promotes  the  happiness  of  self. 
But  it  does  not  follow  that  all  conduct 
which  promotes  the  happiness  of  self  is 
moral.  We  have  to  ask  whether  conduct 
promotes  happiness  because  it  is  moral,  or 
whether  it  is  moral  because  it  promotes 
happiness.  There  is  undoubtedly  a  dis- 
tinction between  different  kinds  of  happi- 


The  Theory  of  Right.  35 

ness,  a  distinction  which  men  generally 
recognize  even  if  its  scientific  validity  be 
questioned. 

For  example,  a  higher  moral  quality  is 
assigned  to  the  happiness  which  comes 
from  satisfying  desires  of  an  aesthetic  and 
philanthropic  kind  than  those  which  come 
from  the  gratification  of  the  appetites  of 
the  body.  But  independent  of  the  distinc- 
tion between  moral  and  immoral  pleasure 
or  happiness  is  a  recognized  distinction 
between  right  and  wrong  apart  from  the 
happiness  involved  in  conduct.  It  is  held 
that  what  is  right  means  something  more 
than  what  is  expedient  or  useful,  and  we 
are  referred  to  certain  broad  and  generally 
accepted  propositions,  such  as  :  It  is  wrong 
to  harm  the  innocent,  the  purity  of  woman 
should  be  respected,  it  is  wrong  to  steal 
It  is  conceivable  that  a  man  should  think 
it  right  to  steal,  should  steal  without  being 
found  out,  in  which  case  nobody's  happi- 
ness would  be  affected  except  his  own,  and 
he  would  not  necessarily  be  unhappy  be- 


36  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

cause  no  remorse  would  follow  the  deed  by 
which  he  acquired  property.  It  is  conceiv- 
able that  a  man  should  kill  another  who 
had  not  wronged  him,  but  who  he  might 
suppose  had  wronged  him,  who  was  gener- 
ally supposed  by  others  to  have  wronged 
him,  and  society  and  law  might  assent  to 
the  act,  the  wrongness  of  which  was  not 
to  be  measured  by  the  happiness  produced. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  society  passes  judg- 
ment as  to  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of 
actions  without  considering  the  happiness 
involved.  Men  have  been  led  to  affirm  that 
there  exists  an  absolute  right  or  wrong 
which  no  circumstances  can  alter. 

Now  I  believe  that  the  whole  difficulty 
with  regard  to  the  nature  of  right  is  di- 
minished if  we  recognize  the  agreement 
between  what  is  right  and  what  brings 
happiness,  in  so  far  as  to  affirm  that  what 
is  right  tends  to  promote  happiness  of  a 
more  enduring  kind  than  what  is  wrong 
does.  We  undoubtedly  in  many  cases  rec- 
ognize the  right  by  the  happiness  which 


The  Theory  of  Right.  37 

follows  its  performance.  According  to 
some,  our  ideas  with  regard  to  duty  and  the 
moral  code  which  is  generally  accepted 
among  civilized  nations  are  a  result  of  long 
experience.  It  has  been  found  that  cer- 
tain general  ways  of  action  promote  the 
general  happiness  more  than  others.  These 
we  call  moral,  and  embody  the  results  of 
experience  in  our  customs  or  laws,  in  our 
social  and  moral  rules,  even  in  our  religion. 
What  is  right,  therefore,  is  determined  by 
the  custom  or  habit  of  the  people.  There 
is  no  general  recognition  of  an  absolute 
right  or  wrong  ;  the  customary  morality  of 
Patagonia  or  Borneo  is  not  the  morality  of 
England  or  Ireland.  What  is  right  in  one 
country  may  be  wrong  in  another.  What 
is  right  in  one  century  is  wrong  in  another. 
This  doctrine  is  reinforced  by  the  discrep- 
ancy often  noticed  between  the  social  and 
legal  sanctions,  or  between  the  moral  and 
religious  sanction.  Much  light  is  thrown 
on  this  subject  by  inquiring  into  the  theory 
of  obligation  and  the  manner  in  which 


$8  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

moral  truth  is  known.  For  the  present  I 
would  suggest  that  the  theory  which  de- 
nies the  existence  of  absolute  morality 
must  show  why  it  is  that  while  the  general 
rules  of  morality  accepted  by  one  nation 
are  undoubtedly  promotive  of  happiness, 
those  of  another  nation  are  quite  the  con- 
trary. Those  who  believe  that  there  is  an 
absolute  right  usually  hold  that  it  is  uni- 
versally and  intuitively  known.  The  utili- 
tarian advances  against  this  theory  the 
very  fact  which  he  cannot  explain  in  his 
own  —  the  variety  of  moral  judgments.  If 
the  ideas  of  morality  prevalent  in  what  we 
call  civilized  society  are  merely  a  growth, 
why  have  they  not  grown  in  uncivilized  so- 
ciety ?  If  these  ideas  are  intuitive,  why  do 
the  institutions  of  the  Thug  or  the  Dervish 
differ  from  those  of  an  English  clergyman  ? 
An  attempt  is  sometimes  made  to  show 
that  Right  means  what  is  fitting ;  and  that 
the  moral  ideal  in  man  is  analogous  to  the 
ideal  with  respect  to  ordinary  objects.  A 
good  man  is  one  who  is  adapted  to  his  sur- 


The  Theory  of  Right.  39 

roundings,  just  as  a  good  knife  cuts  well, 
or  a  good  house  is  comfortable  and  lasting. 
This  attempt  is  a  mere  evasion  of  the  ques- 
tion, which  may  be  put  thus :  Why  is  a 
moral  man  adapted  to  his  surroundings,  or, 
as  we  are  sometimes  prosily  told,  fitted  to 
fulfill  the  end  of  his  being  ?  Is  it  because 
he  is  happier  ?  If  so,  we  are  utilitarians. 
Is  it  because  he  is  conforming  to  some 
principle  of  fitness  ?  If  so,  we  are  no 
nearer  an  explanation  than  before.  The 
ordinary  supporter  of  the  ethics  of  Mr. 
Darwin's  school  finds  fault  with  the  doc- 
trine of  Absolute  Morality,  because  it  does 
not  take  into  account  the  growth  of  man 
in  adaptation  to  his  surroundings  or  "  envi- 
ronment." The  advocate  of  the  Absolute 
theory  may  complain  that  no  standard  is 
furnished  by  the  Evolutionist  to  test  the 
adaptation  of  conduct  to  surroundings. 
Why  is  it  more  moral  to  be  adapted  to 
one's  surroundings  than  not  to  be  so 
adapted  ?  A  country  gentleman  with  a 
good  digestion,  an  active  liver,  a  warm- 


40  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

hearted  generosity,  is  well  adapted  to  his 
surroundings.  It  is  no  trouble  for  him  to 
keep  his  temper,  his  needs  are  well  sup- 
plied, and  he  is  charitable  to  his  neighbors. 
Is  he  a  more  moral  man  than  the  mission- 
ary who  makes  his  family  weep  by  taking 
his  departure  to  the  coast  of  Africa  to 
speak  for  a  while  to  unappreciative  negroes 
and  suffer  martyrdom  like  One  whose 
teaching  he  proclaims  ? 

If  Right  be  a  growth,  the  result  of  de- 
velopment, we  may  inquire,  Where  did  the 
idea  come  from  —  what  was  its  genesis  ? 
The  term  evidently  is  applied,  as  I  have 
said,  to  that  which  one  ought  to  do.  Now, 
however  men  may  differ  as  to  ivhat  they 
ought  to  do,  however  they  may  differ  as  to 
the  absolute  character  of  right,  they  agree 
substantially  as  to  the  existence  of  duty  or 
obligation.  We  are  led  to  inquire,  then, 
How  can  we  know  what  we  ought  to  do  ? 
There  are  two  general  theories  as  to  the 
knowledge  of  moral  distinctions.  The 
first  of  these  may  be  called 


The  TJjeory  of  Right.  41 

1.  The  a  priori,  or  intuitional  view. 

2.  The  a  posteriori,  or  empirical  view. 

Neither  of  these  I  regard  as  wholly  sat- 
isfactory, but  they  may  be  stated  as  fol- 
lows :  — 

The  intuitional  theory  of  knowledge 
maintains  the  absolute  character  of  Right 
and  Wrong.  This  absolute  Right  and 
Wrong  is  known  intuitively,  consequently 
the  knowledge  is  uniform,  or  should  be 
uniform.  The  problem  of  the  intuitionist 
is  to  explain  the  diversity  of  moral  judg- 
ments among  men.  There  is  no  moral 
proposition  as  to  conduct  universally  ac- 
cepted by  all  men,  unless  it  be  that  men 
should  do  their  duty.  So  soon  as  the  ques- 
tion is  asked,  "What  is  my  duty?"  a  vari- 
ety of  answers  is  given.  The  variety  is 
explained  by  the  intuitionist  in  various 
ways.  Men  are  perverted,  according  to 
him,  in  their  judgment  as  to  right  and 
wrong.  But  no  adequate  explanation  is 
offered  as  to  why  this  perversion  is  pos- 
sible. It  is  said  that  morality  is  so  often 


42  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

opposed  to  one's  apparent  interest  and  ap- 
petite that  the  feelings  have  undermined 
the  judgment,  just  as  a  lover  may  overlook 
the  faults  of  the  woman  whom  he  loves, 
or  the  partisan  in  politics  may  regard  the 
demagogue  as  a  statesman.  If  this  be  so, 
then  the  moral  judgment  cannot  be  an  in- 
tuitive judgment.  Intuitive  judgments  are 
necessary,  and  it  is  inconceivable  that  non- 
essential  propositions  should  overbalance 
necessary  judgments.  The  apparent  con- 
flict between  morality  and  self-interest  may 
be  referred  to  in  order  to  explain  immoral 
actions,  but  is  in  no  way  sufficient  to  ex- 
plain judgments  which  contradict  so-called 
necessary  truths. 

A  favorite  form  of  intuitionism  may  be 
noticed  as  affording  an  illustration  of  what 
has  just  been  said.  There  is  said  to  be  a 
judgment  as  to  the  morality  of  individual 
actions  or  states  of  mind  concerning  which 
Tightness  or  wrongness  is  predicated ;  for 
example:  "Murder  is  wrong,"  "Selfish- 
ness is  wrong,"  "Charity  is  right."  The 


The  Theory  of  Right.  43 

subject  of  the  moral  judgment  is  gained 
from  experience.  But  all  moral  or  immoral 
actions  involve  some  principle.  This  prin- 
ciple is  known  intuitively  by  the  Reason. 
If  there  is  an  agreement  between  the  fact 
of  experience  and  the  moral  principle,  we 
are  able  to  predicate  Tightness  of  the  event ; 
if  there  is  disagreement,  we  predicate  the 
contrary,  just  as  we  compare  the  reckoning 
about  concrete  objects  in  arithmetic  with 
the  general  axioms  on  which  our  reckoning 
is  based,  and  just  as  we  refer  successive 
events  to  the  principle  of  causality. 

Without  disputing  the  psychological  cor- 
rectness of  this  theory,  I  would  point  out 
the  fact  that  it  fails  altogether  to  explain 
the  diversity  of  moral  judgments.  Men 
make  mistakes  in  counting,  but  when  the 
rules  of  reckoning  are  explained  to  them 
the  necessity  of  those  rules  is  recognized. 
In  the  same  way,  it  may  be  said,  the  savage 
may  be  civilized  and  made  to  appreciate 
the  fact  that  he  should  not  steal ;  but  the 
necessity  of  the  principle  that  the  theft 


44  -d  Theory  of  Conduct. 

is  wrong  is  altogether  different  from  the 
necessity  that  four  is  more  than  two,  or 
that  twice  five  are  ten.  We  conclude  that 
the  light  of  reason  or  of  nature  does  not 
give  an  immediate  or  intuitive  knowledge 
of  moral  truth. 

The  advocate  of  the  a  posteriori  school 
advances  at  this  point  and  offers  the  ex- 
planation of  the  diversity  of  moral  judg- 
ments among  men,  which  we  have  already 
had  occasion  to  notice  and  to  criticise. 

We  are  confronted,  then,  with  the  fol- 
lowing problems :  If  the  idea  of  right  is 
simply  the  result  of  what  men  have  found 
to  be  conducive  to  happiness,  why  do  we 
regard  morality  as  something  obligatory  in- 
stead of  something  merely  expedient  ?  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  knowledge  of  Right 
is  necessary,  why  is  it  not  universal  ?  I 
believe  that  the  science  of  ethics  furnishes 
no  answer  to  the  question  "What  is 
Right  ?  "  But  this  does  not  imply  that  there 
is  no  absolute  right.  On  the  contrary,  it 
seems  highly  probable  that  such  a  right 


The  Theory  of  Right.  45 

exists,  on  account  of  the  universal  preva- 
lence of  the  idea  of  Duty.  The  science  of 
ethics  thus  reveals  no  definite  ideal  except 
that  of  Happiness  as  the  goal  of  human 
conduct.  It  tells  us  that  there  is  a  right 
which  we  ought  to  regard  as  the  ideal,  but 
what  that  right  is  it  does  not  reveal.  Men 
are  at  sea  without  a  compass  on  a  starless 
night ;  they  are  bound  for  a  port  which 
they  cannot  find ;  which  is  not  on  their 
charts,  for  it  is  still  undiscovered.  If  they 
can  but  avoid  shipwreck  and  reach  any 
shore,  they  have  done  all  that  is  possible, 
and  must  be  content  to  know,  after  they 
come  to  anchor,  whether  they  have  been 
brought  into  their  desired  haven. 


III. 

The  Nature  of  Duty. 

IN  the  foregoing  chapter  the  conclusion 
was  reached  that  man  does  not  know  what 
he  ought  to  do,  but  that  he  ought  to  do 
something;  that  is,  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  duty,  and  that  it  is  an  universally 
prevalent  idea.  The  conception  of  duty 
or  obligation  is  either  original  or  derived. 
Those  who  affirm  that  duty  is  not  an  orig- 
inal conception  may  be  asked  to  explain  its 
origin,  and  attempts  have  been  made  to 
furnish  such  an  explanation.  All  theories 
upon  this  point  may  be  fairly  and  conven- 
iently divided  into  two  classes  :  — 

1.  The  objective  theory. 

2.  The  subjective  theory. 

i.  The  first  of  these  regards  duty  as  a 
product  of  law,  and  law  as  the  product  of 
fear  and  ultimately  of  expediency.  This 


The  Nature  of  Duty.  47 

conclusion  has  been  presented  with  great 
force  by  some  who  have  applied  the  hy- 
pothesis of  evolution  to  the  explanation  of 
ethical  doctrine.  Without  going  further 
back  in  development  than  the  beginning  of 
human  history,  it  may  be  said  that  the  idea 
of  ought  comes  from  the  idea  of  must :  so 
that  moral  obligation  is  an  idea  the  source 
of  which  is  to  be  found  in  social  and  legal 
obligation.  The  authority  of  the  parent 
over  the  child  has  given  rise  to  the  idea 
that  the  commands  of  the  former  are  bind- 
ing upon  the  latter.  The  unquestioned 
commands  of  early  years  become  part  and 
parcel  of  the  rule  which  guides  the  child 
until  in  more  mature  years  another  rule  of 
action  is  prescribed  by  the  society  in  which 
the  man  lives,  and  the  sanctions  of  the  law 
bind  him  to  courses  of  action  which  soci- 
ety regards  as  right,  and  deter  him  from 
actions  which  he  regards  as  wrong.  The 
rule  changes,  but  the  conception  of  duty 
remains.  The  law  may  be  a  law  of  love  in 
family  life,  a  law  of  sympathy  or  interest 


48  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

in  social  life,  a  law  of  fear  in  civil  life,  but 
the  habitual  restraint  of  earlier  periods  be- 
comes the  imperative  "duty"  of  maturity. 
This  theory  fails  to  account  for  the  author- 
ity of  the  parent,  of  society,  of  the  law, 
except  on  the  basis  of  love  and  fear.  The 
child  may  obey  the  parent  from  love,  and 
obey  the  law  from  fear.  But  suppose  that 
on  reaching  maturity  a  question  arises, 
"Ought  I  to  obey  my  father  or  obey  the 
law  ? "  the  ought  would  appear  to  be  an  idea 
independent  of  both  parent  and  law.  Or, 
if  it  be  said  that  sympathy  or  benevolence 
is  the  origin  of  duty,  the  question  arises, 
Why  does  man  have  to  ask  "  ought  I  to  be 
sympathetic  toward  this  man  or  that ; 
ought  I  to  feel  this  benevolence  "  ?  It  is 
highly  probable,  if  not  absolutely  certain, 
that  the  question  of  duty  is  antecedent  to 
the  question  of  love  or  fear.  But  it  may  be 
said,  the  fact  is  that  certain  acts  are  expe- 
dient and  others  inexpedient,  and  it  may 
be  asked,  Is  not  expediency  the  source 
of  duty  ?  But  if  it  be  possible  to  ask  the 


The  Nature  of  Duty.  49 

question,  Is  it  or  is  it  not  my  duty  to  do 
what  is  expedient  ?  then  the  idea  of  duty 
is  logically  antecedent  to  that  of  expedi- 
ency. 

2.  The  origin  of  duty,  however,  may  be 
said  to  be  subjective,  and  to  be  found  in 
self-interest.  Just  as  it  is  to  my  interest 
to  obey  the  law,  to  respect  the  mandates 
of  society,  and  the  authority  of  my  par- 
ents ;  so  the  apprehension  of  this  fact 
raises  in  me  the  idea  of  duty,  because  my 
own  self-interest  is  evidently  the  most  im- 
portant interest  with  which  I  am  con- 
cerned. To  this  the  reply  may  be  made 
that  in  this  case  self-interest  and  duty 
should  not  only  always  coincide,  but  that 
they  should  seem  to  coincide.  This  we 
know  is  very  far  from  being  the  case. 
Even  where  the  agreement  between  self- 
interest  and  duty  is  apprehended,  so  that 
one  cannot  ask,  Ought  I  to  follow  self- 
interest  ?  so  certainly  is  the  answer  affirma- 
tive, it  is  plain  that  the  very  affirmation, 
It  is  my  duty  to  seek  my  own  interest, 


50  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

implies  a  conception  of  duty  not  derived 
from  self-interest  but  independent  of  it.  I 
am  willing  to  admit  that  self-interest  can- 
not be  resolved  into  any  simpler  elements, 
that  egoism  is  a  necessary  quality  of  the 
human  mind,  but  the  history  of  society 
shows  very  plainly  that  duty  too  is  neces- 
sary. Let  us  take  an  interesting  example 
and  consider  the  ethical  position  of  an  ori- 
ental devotee,  who  does  not  believe  in  a 
happy  immortality  but  expects  eternal  an- 
nihilation. Such  an  one  will  inflict  horri- 
ble tortures  upon  his  body,  because  he 
thinks  such  torture  is  demanded  by  his 
duty.  According  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
foregoing  chapter,  he  would  not  inflict  the 
torture  unless  he  desired  to  do  it,  and  so 
far  his  motive  is  egoistic.  But  the  im- 
mediate thought  before  his  mind  is  the 
thought  of  duty.  He  inflicts  the  torture, 
not  because  he  loves  the  torture,  but  be- 
cause he  loves  his  duty.  While  he  loves 
duty  more  than  the  torture,  he  does  not 
love  duty  more  than  he  does  himself,  be- 


The  Nature  of  Duty.  51 

cause  his  self-interest  impels  him  to  do  his 
duty,  and  to  do  his  duty  is  to  him  desira- 
ble. Self-love,  or  egoism,  is  a  far  broader 
conception  than  that  of  duty,  because  it 
includes  the  conception  of  all  acts  which 
are  not  morally  obligatory  and  yet  are 
performed  for  the  happiness  of  self.  But 
duty  is  independent  of  egoism.  For  even 
if  it  be  claimed  that  all  moral  conduct  is 
egoistic,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  ego- 
istic conduct  is  only,  the  content  of  duty 
and  not  a  necessary  part  of  the  conception 
of  duty  as  such.  One  may  believe  it  to  be 
his  duty  to  help  others  at  his  own  incon- 
venience, and  may  refuse  to  do  his  duty. 
Another  may  believe  it  to  be  his  duty  to 
work  for  his  own  interest,  and  he  may  seem 
to  decline  to  work  for  his  own  interest. 
Rightly  or  wrongly,  we  separate  between 
duty  and  egoistic  conduct.  But  as  I  have 
already  said,  the  moment  I  ask  the  per- 
fectly rational  question,  Ought  I  to  be 
selfish?  I  have  thrown  into  jeopardy  the 
subjective  theory  of  the  derivation  of  duty. 


52  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

The  conception  of  obligation  is  neces- 
sary. Just  as  the  laws  of  space  and  time 
and  of  causality  are  necessary  conditions 
of  mathematical  and  natural  science,  so 
the  law  of  duty  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
ethical  science.  That  I  ought  to  do  my 
duty  is  a  necessary  proposition.  The  con- 
tent of  duty  is  various  and  accidental.  Ac- 
cordingly we  find  egoism  or  altruism  or  re- 
ligion filling  the  empty  form.  Duty  will 
lead  one  into  the  temple  of  Venus,  another 
into  the  monastery ;  in  one  nation  it  will 
make  the  mother  sacrifice  her  own  life  for 
her  child,  in  another  to  cast  the  child  into 
the  sacred  river ;  in  one  nation  it  will  se- 
cure the  condemnation  of  vice  and  crime, 
in  another  it  will  make  them  objects  of 
worship.  Like  some  mysterious  oracle,  it 
calls  on  men  to  act  and  does  not  tell  them 
what  to  do. 

It  will  be  seen  at  once,  by  any  one  fa- 
miliar with  the  Critical  Philosophy,  that 
the  conclusion  I  have  reached  with  regard 
to  the  nature  of  obligation  is  in  some 


The  Nature  of  Duty.  5  f 

respects  analogous  to  the  Kantian  doctrine 
as  to  synthetic  judgments  a  priori.  The 
judgment  of  what  it  is  our  duty  to  do  is  an 
a  posteriori  judgment.  The  judgment  that 
conduct  is  related  to  duty  as  being  right  or 
wrong  is  an  a  priori  judgment.  It  is  im- 
possible to  conceive  of  conduct  which  is 
not  either  wrong  or  not  wrong,  but  there 
may  be  a  variety  of  conclusions  reached  as 
to  what  is  wrong  and  what  is  not  wrong. 
An  illustration  of  the  principle  of  causality 
will  make  this  doctrine  of  duty  still  plainer. 
A  certain  change  in  nature  is  observed. 
What  the  cause  of  that  change  may  be  is 
not  known,  but  investigation  may  reveal 
the  cause,  and  yet  different  investigators 
may  reach  different  conclusions  as  to  what 
produced  the  change.  That  there  was  a 
cause  for  the  change  requires  no  demon- 
stration. The  fact  that  there  was  a  cause 
is  a  necessary  truth.  A  terrific'  explosion 
occurs  and  a  building  is  found-  in  ruins. 
The  police  attribute  the  shock  to  dynamite ; 
some  think  that  it  was  due  to  the  weak- 


54  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

ness  of  the  boiler,  others  to  gunpowder; 
the  proprietor  explains  that  it  came  from 
the  carelessness  of  the  engineer  who  had 
charge  of  the  boiler.  He  reaches  the  con- 
clusion empirically,  and  shows  empirically 
that  other  explanations  of  the  disaster  are 
unfounded,  but  in  every  case  reference  was 
made  to  the  principle  of  causality  which 
forbade  the  idea  that  the  disaster  was 
uncaused.  A  man  kills  another.  At  once 
the  question  is  asked,  Was  the  killing  right 
or  wrong  ?  Opinions  differ.  Some  say  he 
did  right,  others  that  he  did  wrong,  and  no 
decision  is  reached.  All  recognize  the  fact 
when  it  is  brought  to  their  notice  that  the 
action  was  either  right  or  not  right.  The 
form  of  duty  is  referred  to  just  as  in  the 
purely  intellectual  case  the  form  of  causal- 
ity is  referred  to.  This  I  conceive  to  be  the 
relation  subsisting  between  the  That  and 
the  What  of  morality.  If  it  be  admitted, 
however,  that  duty  exists,  it  becomes  im- 
portant to  determine  what  one's  duty  is, 
and  here  it  is  that  experience  comes  to  our 


The  Nature  of  Duty.  55 

aid,  and  the  question  may  be  discussed, 
What  shall  we  do  ?  Here,  too,  is  to  be  ap- 
plied once  more  the  doctrine  already  no- 
ticed, that  there  must  be  an  agreement  be- 
tween morality  and  happiness  in  order  to 
insure  the  performance  of  moral  conduct. 
The  term  duty,  then,  is  to  be  applied  to  an 
aprioriiorm  of  knowledge.  The  a  posteriori 
knowledge  of  which  that  form  is  the  con- 
dition is  a  product  of  experience.  Unless 
men  are  Pessimists  it  must  be  held  that 
there  is  an  agreement  between  morality 
and  happiness.  It  is  reasonable  to  con- 
clude that  the  conduct  which  results  in  the 
greatest  amount  of  happiness  is  the  most 
moral  conduct,  i.  e.,  is  conduct  which  we 
ought  to  follow. 

Such  a  theory  as  that  which  I  have  just 
suggested  raises  the  same  question  with 
regard  to  the  form  of  the  moral  judgment 
which  is  raised  with  regard  to  other  neces- 
sary forms  of  judgment.  It  raises  the  old 
issue  between  the  a  priori  and  a  posteriori 
schools  of  philosophy,  Can  we  explain 


56  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

necessary  truth  by  means  of  experience? 
Experience  is  ultimately  an  appeal  to  the 
senses,  and  it  must  be  shown  empirically 
that  what  we  call  the  form  of  obligation  or 
duty  has  its  origin  in  the  ordinary  percep- 
tions of  the  five  senses,  or  in  the  more  inti- 
mate sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain.  The 
utter  dissimilarity  between  sensations  such 
as  color  and  sound  and  touch  make  the  ex- 
planation of  the  idea  of  duty  from  these 
even  more  uncertain  than  the  explanation 
of  causality  or  space  or  time  from  such  im- 
pressions. The  utter  independence  of 
pleasurable  conduct  and  conduct  which 
ought  to  be  performed,  in  the  mature  mind, 
render  it  extremely  improbable  that  what 
is  pleasurable  has  given  rise  to  the  idea  of 
duty.  Such  a  result  could  be  traced  only 
by  a  patient  following  of  the  development 
of  mind  from  its  earliest  stages,  even  if 
those  stages  belong  to  forms  of  primitive 
organic  existence.  How  far  this  can  be 
done  is  very  uncertain.  It  seems  to  me 
that  the  most  important  question  that  the 


The  Nature  of  Duty.  57 

theory  of  knowledge  presents  to  us  is  the 
question  whether  necessary  truth  can  be 
shown  not  to  be  ultimate.  So  far  no  the- 
ory of  the  evolution  of  morality  has  given 
any  definite  account  of  the  origin  of  moral 
obligation.  Of  the  development  of  judg- 
ments as  to  right  and  wrong  we  have  many 
accounts,  but  the  formation  of  a  moral 
judgment  about  anything  implies  the  form 
of  oughtness  as  the  logical  condition  with- 
out which  the  moral  judgment,  whether 
mistaken  or  not,  could  not  be  framed. 


IV. 

The  Nature  of  Character. 

THE  evidence  of  the  nature  of  Charac- 
ter is  to  be  determined  by  experience. 
A  man  forms  a  judgment  with  respect  to 
his  own  character  by  reviewing  his  past 
thoughts  and  actions ;  he  estimates  the 
character  of  his  fellow-men  by  inferences 
from  their  expressions  of  thought.  In 
modern  ethical  science  the  place  of  char- 
acter has  acquired  great  importance,  espe- 
cially in  connection  with  the  doctrine  of 
the  will.  For  example,  when  the  deter- 
minist,  in  defending  his  position,  argues 
that  the  will  is  governed  by  motives  which 
are  beyond  the  control  of  the  agent,  it  is 
affirmed  on  the  contrary  by  the  advocates 
of  freedom  that  the  effect  of  the  motives 
is  conditioned  by  the  character,  and  that 
character  determines  the  will.  Character 


The  Nature  of  Character.  59 

becomes  in  this  way  more  or  less  identi- 
fied with  the  person  of  a  man,  with  his 
real  self.  We  speak,  for  example,  of  a 
person  not  merely  having,  but  being,  a  bad 
character.  Let  us  suppose,  for  example, 
the  case  of  a  man  whose  desire  is  excited 
toward  some  object  which  he  feels  that  he 
ought  not  to  possess.  The  immorality  of 
the  pleasurable  conduct  which  is  suggested 
to  him  is  weighed  in  comparison  with  the 
morality  of  the  painful  conduct.  Now  it 
is  argued  that  the  motives  alone  are  not 
sufficient  to  determine  his  conduct,  but 
that  character  conditions  the  determina- 
tion. The  problem,  then,  is  to  explain  char- 
acter ;  to  show  its  origin.  If  we  take  the 
empirical  view  of  the  matter,  the  states  of 
mind  antecedent  to  the  action  of  the  will 
are  causes  of  the  will's  action,  and  we  are 
not  at  liberty  to  introduce  any  third  some- 
thing, such  as  character  or  ego,  to  con- 
dition the  effect  of  the  motive.  For  the 
ego  is  not  given  empirically,  and  in  that 
case  character  is  either  wholly  or  in  part 


60  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

unknown,  or  becomes  simply  a  series  of 
phenomena.  A  man's  character  is  an 
inconstant  something,  changing  with  the 
change  of  phenomena.  Abandoning,  how- 
ever, the  metaphysical  view  of  character 
as  related  to  self,  we  may  notice  its  ethi- 
cal significance.  A  character  which  is 
morally  good  is  one  which  has  a  tendency 
to  effect  right  actions.  Our  estimate  of 
what  constitutes  a  good  character  will 
therefore  vary  according  to  the  standard 
of  morality  adopted.  For  example,  if  we 
hold  that  the  happiness  of  others  is  the 
standard  of  conduct,  then  a  good  char- 
acter means  one  which  tends  to  promote 
such  happiness. 

It  happens,  however,  that  either  by  per- 
sonal experience  or  training  civilized  peo- 
ple are  in  agreement  generally  as  to  the 
actions  which  are  called  moral,  and  we 
need  not  introduce  at  this  point  a  discus- 
sion as  to  the  moral  standard.  One  or 
two  illustrations  may  serve  to  make  clear 
the  conclusion  which  I  am  about  to  draw. 


7 'be  Nature  of  Character.  61 

Let  us  suppose,  in  the  first  place,  the 
case  of  a  person  who  is  born  among  crim- 
inals and  trained  to  look  upon  moral  ob- 
liquity as  praiseworthy.  He  is  educated 
so  that  he  lives  by  theft,  he  is  punished 
by  the  law,  he  is  hardened  by  association 
with  convicts,  and  is  an  outcast  from  so- 
ciety. The  general  tendency  of  his  life  is 
bad,  and  if  he  does  right  it  is  from  the 
worst  of  motives.  We  say  of  such  an  one, 
his  character  is  bad. 

Let  us  suppose  the  case  of  one  born 
amid  moral  and  religious  surroundings, 
and  throughout  his  early  life  warned  and 
guarded  against  the  "world,  the  flesh,  and 
the  devil ; "  educated  to  respect  the  prop- 
erty, the  feelings,  of  others.  We  say  of 
such  an  one,  his  character  is  good. 

Let  us  suppose,  however,  that  to  the 
two  men  the  same  temptation  comes ; 
for  example,  the  commission  of  a  murder 
to  gain  some  important  end.  The  former 
commits  it  on  account  of  his  surroundings 
having  been  so  bad  as  to  make  him  look 


62  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

with  but  little  horror  on  the  awful  conse- 
quences of  taking  human  life.  The  sec- 
ond man  resists  the  temptation  because 
he  has  been  differently  trained.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  the  character  here  has  a  control- 
ling influence  in  determining  the  man's 
actions ;  but  character  has  been  modified 
by  circumstances.  If  these  be  regarded 
for  the  present  as  typical  cases,  we  may 
ask,  Why  did  not  the  bad  man  resist  the 
evil  surroundings  in  time  to  make  his  char- 
acter good  enough  to  avoid  committing  the 
murder  ?  We  may  ask  in  like  manner, 
Why  did  not  the  good  man  resist  the  bad 
surroundings,  and  why  did  he  reach  a  stage 
of  demoralization  which  made  him  suc- 
cumb to  the  temptation  to  murder  ?  If 
such  a  condition  of  things  was  not  possi- 
ble, it  follows  that  character  is  made  good 
or  bad  by  the  surroundings  of  a  man  ;  and 
if  this  be  so  he  cannot,  according  to  his 
character,  resist  the  influence  of  that  which 
makes  his  character  what  it  is.  If  we  take 
the  other  alternative,  then  there  is  a  char- 


The  Nature  of  Character.  6) 

acter  with  which  a  man  is  born  which  de- 
termines whether  he  is  able  to  resist  evil 
influences.  And  here  it  seems  to  me  we 
have  presented  to  us  a  subject  of  surpass- 
ing importance  and  difficulty  in  the  science 
of  ethics.  I  am  anxious  in  discussing  it 
to  avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  needless  opposi- 
tion to  doctrines  not  essential  to  the  point 
to  be  noticed.  For  this  purpose  I  am 
ready  to  admit,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
that  the  will  is  free,  and  that  motives  in- 
duce, but  do  not  compel,  the  agent  to  con- 
duct himself  in  such  and  such  a  way. 
Here  is  the  solemn  truth,  however,  which 
meets  every  one  who  observes  human  con- 
duct. Every  man  or  woman  who  comes 
into  the  world  comes  "  not  in  entire  forget- 
fulness  and  not  in  utter  nakedness."  No 
mind  is  a  tabula  rasa,  which  begins  its 
career  on  the  day  when  the  body  is  born. 
No  nervous  system  which  belongs  to  an 
infant  body  is  isolated  and  distinct  from 
the  lives  which  have  preceded  it.  On  the 
contrary,  every  child  expresses  the  result, 


64  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

the  last  effect,  of  a  long  —  one  may  almost 
say  an  infinite  —  series  of  causes.  The 
parents  and  grandparents,  many  genera- 
tions of  parents,  may  be  known,  but  who 
can  tell  through  what  these  ancestors  have 
passed  ?  It  is  possible,  and  indeed  almost 
certain,  that  in  the  long  line  of  progeni- 
tors which  aristocrat  and  pauper  alike  pos- 
sess, there  have  been  here  and  there  men 
of  low,  mean  disposition;  there  have  been 
men  whose  character  seemed  an  emana- 
tion from  hell ;  men  addicted  to  nameless 
crimes,  to  debauchery,  to  cruelty.  There 
are  those  whose  forefathers  have  been 
drunkards,  or  insane,  or  convicted  felons. 
I  am  disposed  to  think  that  heirlooms  of 
this  kind  are  seldom  wholly  lost,  for  we 
can  see  how  hereditary  characteristics  are 
perpetuated  until  they  are  stamped  indeli- 
bly not  only  on  families,  but  on  races. 
There  is  a  deep  physiological  and  psycho- 
logical truth  in  the  old-fashioned  doctrine 
of  original  sin,  and  it  is  a  serious  fact  to 
contemplate.  It  is  impossible  to  tell  when 


The  Nature  of  Character.  65 

a  boy  or  girl  is  born  what  particular  ten- 
dency may  be  lurking  in  his  or  her  mind 
or  body  potentially,  ready  to  spring  up  on 
some  occasion  being  offered,  and  bring 
desolation  and  ruin.  And  if  the  hypothe- 
sis of  Darwin  be  true,  and  our  ancestry  is 
not  limited  to  the  human  species,  one  can- 
not say  definitely  that  qualities  belonging 
to  the  brutes  have  not  left  indelible  marks 
upon  our  own  highly  perfected  organisms. 
If  such  a  view  be  regarded  as  fantastical, 
it  is  sufficient  for  us  to  notice  how  habits 
descend  in  families,  even  where  the  sur- 
roundings of  the  children  differ  from  those 
of  the  parents.  If  the  natural  history  of 
many  of  those  who  fill  our  asylums  and 
prisons  were  studied,  it  would  be  found 
that  the  causes  of  these  wandering  minds 
and  vicious  lives  were  not  independent  of 
hereditary  influences.  The  side  of  these 
facts  which  is  most  often  noticed  is  the 
serious  warning  it  gives  to  those  about  to 
marry  to  see  to  it  that  they  do  not  know- 
ingly perpetuate  corruption  in  the  phy- 


66  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

sique  and  morals  of  their  children.  But  to 
my  mind  the  more  serious  aspect  is  that 
which  belongs  to  the  possible  moral  train- 
ing of  those  who  have  inherited  the  tram- 
mels and  vices  which  in  many  cases  have 
wrecked  the  lives  of  their  ancestors.  It 
becomes  a  matter  of  vital  importance  to 
determine  whether,  if  morality  be  largely 
dependent  on  character,  and  if  one's  char- 
acter be  an  inheritance  which  one's  life 
simply  wastes  or  puts  out  at  interest,  — 
whether,  I  say,  ethical  science  can  furnish 
a  moral  code  at  all  and  insist  that  it  should 
be  obeyed. 

Whether,  then,  we  adopt  the  doctrine  of 
freedom  or  not,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
every  man  is  born  with  certain  inherited 
dispositions  or  tendencies,  which  are  more 
or  less  eradicable,  according  to  the  strength 
of  their  persistence  and  the  force  of  cir- 
cumstances. And  it  is  an  encouragement 
to  the  social  reformer  that  in  many  cases 
men  have  not  only  been  raised  to  a  high 
plane  of  morality  when  their  birth  and  sur- 


The  Nature  of  Character.  67 

roundings  have  been  degraded,  but  also 
that  many  have  been  capable  of  elevation 
when  removed  from  their  low  surround- 
ings. In  opposition  to  these  facts  may  be 
cited  cases  of  some,  the  vices  of  whose 
ancestry  have  reappeared  in  their  own 
lives  in  spite  of  all  efforts  at  reform.  The 
science  of  human  nature  has  not  reached 
a  point  where  it  is  possible  to  distinguish 
between  native  and  acquired  qualities; 
but  it  is  no  less  certain  that  inherited 
character  is  a  powerful,  though  indetermi- 
nate, element  in  the  composition  of  con- 
duct. When,  therefore,  it  is  affirmed  that 
every  man  is  the  author  of  his  own  charac- 
ter, we  must  consider  that  an  element  in 
the  formation  of  such  character  is  inher- 
ited character.  The  importance  of  this 
view  will  be  appreciated  when  it  is  remem- 
bered how  strenuously  men  are  everywhere 
seeking  their  own  happiness,  and  how  the 
ideal  of  happiness  differs  according  to  dif- 
ferent characters. 

There  are  cases  in  which  a  man,  accord- 


68  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

ing  to  his  own  confession  and  the  testi- 
mony of  his  friends,  lived  a  pure  and  ex- 
emplary life,  who  nevertheless  succumbed 
to  some  severe  temptation,  and  committed 
acts  which  men  with  a  far  worse  experi- 
ence would  hesitate  to  perform.  There 
are  virtuous  women  who  commit  deeds 
from  which  their  abandoned  sisters  would 
often  shrink.  There  are  men  of  purity 
and  benevolence  who,  when  they  fall,  fall 
lower  than  the  average  of  criminals.  It 
is  difficult  to  affirm  of  any  man  or  woman 
that  his  or  her  character  is  good  until  their 
respective  lives,  with  the  temptations  to 
which  they  have  been  subjected,  are  passed 
in  review ;  and  it  can  hardly  be  called  ac- 
cidental that  the  tombstone  is  the  place 
where  an  estimate  of  character  is  most 
often  to  be  found,  although  many  epitaphs 
are  lies.  To  those  who  look  upon  moral 
and  immoral  courses  of  conduct  as  effects 
of  mere  caprice,  the  estimate  of  real  charac- 
ter is  unimportant.  But  no  one  who  looks 
at  conduct  scientifically  can  fail  to  be  per- 


The  Nature  of  Character.  69 

plexed  at  the  extraordinary  deviations  of 
good  men  into  bad  paths.  We  conclude 
that  character  often  lies  hidden  in  the 
realm  of  the  unconscious.  It  is  there- 
fore a  truth  of  science  as  well  as  of  re- 
ligion that  in  the  crucible  of  life  gold  is 
often  found  in  what  seemed  brass  and  clay, 
while  many  a  highly  valued  gem  is  con- 
sumed in  the  devouring  fire  of  experience. 

The  problem  of  ethics  is  thus  further 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  every  influ- 
ence for  good  may  be  brought  to  bear  upon 
a  man  when  his  character  is  such  that  lit- 
tle benefit  will  follow  from  such  influence. 

The  principle  of  heredity  is  every  day 
becoming  more  and  more  important  in 
philosophy.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  is 
very  difficult  to  show  any  regularity  or  law 
in  the  transmission  of  qualities  from  parent 
to  child,  the  fact  that  there  is  such  a  trans- 
mission is  established  beyond  all  doubt. 
The  theory  of  development  clearly  shows 
that  the  individual  life  is  not  sufficient  to 
explain  the  tendencies  which  characterize 


70  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

it.  Particularly  in  the  lower  animal  world 
are  the  effects  of  heredity  clearly  appar- 
ent. This  principle  must  be  taken  ac- 
count of  by  the  psychologist  as  well  as  by 
the  naturalist,  particularly  in  the  relation 
of  the  science  of  mind  to  neurology.  It 
is  clearly  established  that  there  is  a  cer- 
tain correspondence  between  the  phenom- 
ena of  mind  and  those  of  the  central  ner- 
vous system.  According  to  some,  there 
is  more  than  a  correspondence,  and  the 
phenomena  of  the  one  are  causally  related 
to  those  of  the  other.  The  embryonic 
brain  is  comparatively  simple  and  homo- 
geneous in  the  earlier  stages  of  its  growth, 
and  it  is  impossible  to  affirm  that  it  pos- 
sesses any  more  psychological  significance 
than  the  liver  or  the  heart.  But  the  fully 
developed  central  nervous  system  in  man, 
by  reason  of  its  complexity,  admits  of 
many  modifications  which  are  difficult  to 
trace,  much  less  to  explain.  Yet,  just  as 
diseases  of  other  organs  are  transmitted 
from  parent  to  child,  so  peculiarities  and 


The  Nature  of  Character.          // 

disorders  of  the  nervous  system  are  trans- 
mitted, and  often  a  definite  hereditary 
physical  condition  may  be  shown  to  be  the 
cause  of  mental  changes.  But  even  where 
the  causes  of  nervous  phenomena  cannot 
be  traced,  it  can  be  observed  that  mental 
characteristics,  the  physical  conditions  or 
accompaniments  of  which  are  unknown, 
pass  to  a  man  from  his  progenitors.  It 
is  very  easy  to  say  that  hereditary  ten- 
dencies, however  marked,  may  be  over- 
come by  education  and  training,  so  that 
even  were  a  man  to  be  born  with  a  dis- 
tinctly vicious  disposition,  such  a  disposi- 
tion might  be  changed  by  virtuous  sur- 
roundings. It  is  easy  to  say  that  such 
vicious  hereditary  characteristics  are  un- 
common. Indeed,  with  the  exception  of 
certain  forms  of  disease,  the  qualities  of 
mind  and  body  which  can  be  proved  to 
be  hereditary  are  in  most  cases  trivial ; 
but  the  fact  that  these  qualities  are  trans- 
mitted cannot  be  denied.  If  the  effect 
of  this  transmission  can  be  overcome,  the 


7-2  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

means  of  the  overcoming  must  be  an  effort 
of  the  will,  or  of  motives  effected  by  one's 
surroundings,  or  both.  If  the  hereditary 
tendency  is  overcome  by  an  effort  of  the 
will,  according  to  our  premises  the  will 
is  dependent  on  the  character.  A  charac- 
ter, then,  which  changes  its  evil  tenden- 
cies is,  according  to  the  hypothesis,  an  evil 
character,  which  is  absurd.  If  the  heredi- 
tary tendency  is  overcome  by  motives  sup- 
plied by  one's  surroundings,  then  there  is 
no  freedom  to  change.  But  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  same  surroundings  will 
produce  different  results  upon  different 
men,  the  difference  in  result  being  the 
effect  of  a  difference  of  character.  If  both 
surroundings  and  character  combine  to  ef- 
fect the  change,  there  cannot  be  said  to 
be  freedom,  for  the  surroundings  are  not 
the  result  of  the  man's  volition,  otherwise 
they  are  due  to  his  character.  But  his 
character,  before  his  surroundings  have 
changed  it,  is  something  with  which  he 
has  had  nothing  to  do.  A  moral  or  an 


The  Nature  of  Character.  73 

immoral  progenitor  may  have  had  a  great 
deal  to  do  with  it,  and  such  a  progenitor 
may  in  turn  examine  his  own  pedigree  to 
find  remote  causes  for  his  individual  char- 
acteristics. It  may  be  said,  however,  that, 
independent  of  both  character  and  sur- 
roundings, is  the  free  ego  or  self,  which 
controls  man's  moral  action  whatever  the 
antecedents,  whatever  the  surroundings. 
All  roads  lead  to  Rome ;  and  I  have  yet 
to  find  any  doctrine  of  ethics  which  did 
not  lead  one  to  the  question  as  to  the 
freedom  of  the  will.  This  is  a  subject 
which  has  been  worn  absolutely  thread- 
bare in  modern  philosophy,  and  it  is  not 
my  intention  to  attempt  a  solution  of  the 
problem  in  this  treatise.  Believing  as  I 
do  that  change  is  unthinkable  except  in 
the  category  of  causation,  the  affirmation 
that  the  will  is  free,  or  that  self  is  free  to 
will,  seems  to  me  thoroughly  unwarranted 
either  by  fact  or  reason.  It  has  been  said 
that  either  freedom  is  a  fact  or  moral  re- 
sponsibility is  a  delusion.  Whether  this 


y4  4  Theory  cf  Conduct. 

alternative  is  to  be  accepted  or  not,  from 
a  philosophical  point  of  view,  it  would 
seem  to  be  inadvisable  to  make  our  meta- 
physics or  logic  the  slave  of  ethics.  If 
self  and  character  be  identical,  then  the 
qualities  of  self  are  determined  in  the  first 
instance  independently  of  the  will.  It  may 
be  said,  however,  that  self  can  modify  its 
own  character,  that  is,  character  is  a  spe- 
cies of  veneer  that  one  finds  self  covered 
with  at  birth ;  but  that  on  the  presentation 
of  motives  self  acts  freely,  and,  removing 
one  coat  of  veneer,  applies  another  of  a 
different  kind.  If  we  hold  that  self  can 
be  an  object  of  knowledge,  then  it  would 
be  interesting  to  know  wherein  the  self 
and  the  character  differ.  If,  however,  we 
hold  the  view  that  self  is  subject  and  is 
anterior  to  knowledge,  the  problem  as  to 
character  and  freedom  has  a  very  different 
meaning.  Some  of  the  great  schools  of 
modern  German  thought  prefer  to  take 
the  latter  view.  It  is  held  that  self,  the 
ego,  is  not  a  phenomenon,  is  not  given  in 


The  Nature  of  Character.  75 

experience.  Causality  is  a  category  appli- 
cable to  phenomena  only.  It  is  logical, 
therefore,  to  regard  self  as  independent 
of  causality  as  itself  a  cause,  but,  even 
when  viewed  as  changing,  not  an  effect. 
The  noumenal  self,  as  Ding  an  sick,  is  not 
subject  to  the  law  of  causation,  and  is 
therefore  free.  While  this  is  logically  plau- 
sible, it  is  an  argument  which  will  not  bear 
close  inspection.  For  example,  the  motive 
avarice,  which  is  the  effect  on  my  charac- 
ter of  the  sight  of  gold,  suggests  that  I 
should  steal ;  the  motive  compassion  — 
the  effect  upon  my  character  of  the  sight 
of  the  owner  of  the  gold  —  suggests  that 
I  should  not  steal.  Suppose  that  there  is 
no  third  alternative.  If  the  owner  is  ab- 
sent the  compassion  is  absent,  and  theft 
follows.  If  the  owner  is  present,  it  may 
be  said  that  I  can  choose  between  steal- 
ing and  not  stealing.  If  I  fail  to  steal, 
the  failure  is  related  to  the  motive  as  ef- 
fect to  cause.  It  is  of  no  importance  that 
we  speak  of  the  ego  willing,  if  the  partic- 


j6  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

ular  act  of  will  would  not  have  taken  place 
in  the  absence  of  the  motive  :  the  motive 
is  the  cause,  and  the  will  is  not  free. 

The  continuous  action  of  surroundings 
on  the  will  through  the  character  produces 
a  more  or  less  decided  tendency  to  will  in 
a  certain  way.  From  this  practical  moral- 
ists draw  the  conclusion  that  indulgence 
of  the  appetites,  for  example,  weakens  the 
will,  or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  leads  the 
will  to  will  what  satisfies  the  appetites. 
On  the  contrary,  if  the  character  of  a  man 
is  sufficiently  strong  to  overcome  the  influ- 
ence of  surroundings  which  tend  to  make 
him  indulge  his  appetites,  a  continued 
course  of  such  willing  increases  the  resist- 
ing power.  We  have  in  these  cases  a  suf- 
ficient answer  to  a  statement  often  made 
with  regard  to  the  comparative  strength 
of  character  in  different  men.  It  is  some- 
times said  that  a  man  who  has  successfully 
resisted  a  great  temptation  deserves  as 
little  credit  as  the  one  who  has  yielded 
to  the  same  temptation  ;  because  in  the 


The  Nature  of  Character.  77 

former  case  the  effort  required  was  not  so 
great  as  in  the  latter  case.  We  are  told 
that  X.,  whose  appetites  are  not  so  strong 
as  those  of  Y.,  deserves  less  credit  than 
Y.  if  they  are  resisted ;  while  if  Y.  yields 
to  them  his  conduct  is  less  culpable.  This 
would  be  true  if  their  characters  were 
wholly  formed  and  remained  unchanged  by 
their  habits  of  volition  and  their  surround- 
ings. But  it  may  be  the  case  that  X.  is 
able  to  resist  the  great  temptation  because 
he  has  accustomed  himself  to  resist  temp- 
tations in  general,  while  Y.  does  not  ap- 
preciate the  greatness  of  the  temptation 
until  he  is  confronted  with  it.  In  case  Y. 
does  resist  the  temptation,  other  things 
being  equal,  the  sum  of  the  amounts  of 
resistance  to  previous  temptations  in  the 
case  of  X.  may  be  far  greater  than  the 
whole  amount  of  resistance  required  by  Y. 
in  the  great  temptation  supposed. 

It  seems  to  me  very  doubtful  whether 
the  unconscious  element  in  mental  life  is 
sufficiently  considered.  The  qualities  of 


7<S  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

mind  which  lie  latent  or  dormant  may 
make  or  unmake  one's  happiness.  Every- 
body knows  how  some  chance  idea,  by  its 
associations,  may  effect  the  reproduction 
of  other  ideas  apparently  long  forgotten. 
In  my  opinion  the  unconscious  tract  of  our 
mental  life  is  the  source  of  many  of  those 
capacities  and  abilities  which  sometimes 
surprise  ourselves  and  others.  Emergen- 
cies or  the  hardships  of  life  may  rouse  an 
apparently  commonplace  man  to  deeds  of 
heroism.  The  shocks  and  afflictions  of  this 
rough  world  may  convert  a  sensualist  into 
an  ascetic,  a  doubter  into  a  believer,  a  sen- 
timentalist into  a  cynic.  There  is  many  a 
poor  wretch  whose  whole  life  has  been 
given  to  crime,  who  has  hidden  in  the  un- 
conscious chambers  of  his  mind  capacities 
which  may  be  awakened  into  high  moral 
activity.  And  it  will  not  do  for  us  to  sneer 
at  the  ecstatic  fervor  of  the  mystic  be- 
cause he  cannot  trace  in  consciousness 
the  causes  of  his  ecstasy,  when  we  reflect 
that  upon  that  region  beyond  the  reach  of 


Tbe  Nature  of  Character.  79 

human  consciousness  there  may  be  moving 
with  irresistible  energy  the  influence  of  an 
Infinite  Spirit. 

This  uncertain  element  in  character, 
which  is  not  before  consciousness,  leads 
one  to  look  with  a  kind  of  wonder  on  the 
career  of  one's  fellow-men  as  well  as  on 
one's  own  career.  Our  moral  life  is  not 
a  smooth  plain  upon  which  our  past  is 
plainly  visible  and  our  destiny  discernible. 
It  is  a  rugged,  rolling  country,  full  of  hid- 
den ways,  and  pits  and  hills  and  valleys  ; 
while  beyond  lies  a  region  of  which  we 
know  but  little,  except  by  the  faint  light 
which  lingers  on  the  horizon,  and  is  sug- 
gestive of  something  which  we  cannot 
see. 


V. 

The  Motive  to  Morality. 

IF,  as  I  have  endeavored  to  show,  the 
test  of  morality  is  the  amount  of  happiness 
resulting  from  moral  conduct,  and  if  there 
be  no  intuitive  knowledge  of  what  is  right 
or  wrong,  it  would  seem  natural  that  expe- 
rience should  determine  wherein  morality 
consists.  We  have  already  found,  how- 
ever, that  the  experience  of  men  as  to 
what  constitutes  happiness  is  varied.  We 
have  concluded  that  both  character  and 
training  determine  to  a  very  important  ex- 
tent the  view  of  happiness  which  may  be 
adopted.  The  empirical  method  in  ethics 
can  be  applied  to  the  solution  of  this  prob- 
lem. Just  as  the  world  is  learning  every 
day  more  and  more  about  natural  science, 
so  it  is  growing  more  intelligent  in  ethical 
science.  Just  as  we  understand  how  to 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  81 

apply  electricity  and  steam  better  than  our 
ancestors  understood  it,  so  we  can  learn 
from  the  experience  of  past  generations 
what  the  best  means  are  of  promoting  hap- 
piness, and  so  are  in  a  way  to  reach  a 
higher  standard  of  moral  conduct.  It  is 
not  possible  for  us  to  enter  here  upon  the 
consideration  of  the  old  question,  whether 
civilization  really  increases  human  happi- 
ness,—  for  example,  whether  the  average 
European  or  American  is  really  happier 
than  the  average  African  or  Asiatic  ?  But 
assuming  that  barbarous  conduct  is  less 
happy  in  its  consequences  than  the  con- 
duct of  those  who  are  civilized,  we  meet 
with  a  difficulty.  In  what  respect  is  the 
happiness  of  civilization  superior  to  that 
of  barbarism  ?  We  have  already  shown 
that  the  quality  of  happiness  is  not  to  be 
considered,  but  only  its  quantity  or  inten- 
sity. If,  then,  a  man's  character  and 
training  are  such  that  he  gains  happiness 
from  sensuality  and  debauchery  and  blood- 
shed, and  would  not  understand  or  appre- 


82  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

ciate  the  pleasures  of  civilization,  we  must 
test  the  morality  of  his  conduct  according 
to  another  standard  than  that  of  happi- 
ness. It  will  be  generally  admitted,  how- 
ever, that  the  more  intelligent  men  become 
the  better  able  they  are  to  determine  what 
is  conducive  to  happiness.  They  pass  from 
the  natural  state  described  by  Hobbes  into 
a  civil  state,  and  discover  that  their  own 
happiness  can  be  attained  only  by  regard- 
ing the  happiness  of  others.  The  way  in 
which  society  regards  human  actions,  the 
laws  which  are  made  and  enforced,  are  the 
result  of  generalizations  leading  to  a  cor- 
rect estimate  of  the  means  to  happiness. 
Independently,  therefore,  of  revelation  and 
of  intuition,  it  may  be  freely  admitted  that 
morality  is  progressive.  The  different  de- 
grees of  happiness  are  discovered,  their 
relative  values  estimated,  and  knowledge 
is  gained  as  to  how  that  happiness  is  best 
to  be  advanced.  What  we  call  the  social 
instincts  or  feelings  are  a  great  aid  in 
reaching  this  result ;  and  the  lower  appe- 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  8$ 

tites  are  largely  controlled  by  the  natural 
benevolence  and  sympathy  which  is  found 
in  every  race  of  men  in  some  slight  de- 
gree. It  is  taught  that  the  happiness  of 
others  must  be  the  principal  object  of  our 
action  if  we  would  secure  our  own.  The 
formula  of  Bentham  and  the  categorical 
imperative  of  Kant  are  admirable  general 
rules  of  action  ;  but  the  difficulty  is  to 
determine  how  to  put  them  into  practice. 

I.  There  is  the  difficulty  of  applying  the 
general  rule  to  the  special  case  which  gives 
rise  to  questions  of  casuistry.  Socrates 
tells  us  that  only  the  unwise  man  will  be 
immoral.  This  is  theoretically  true.  If 
morality  brings  me  more  happiness  than 
immorality,  then,  if  I  know  this,  and  know 
what  brings  happiness,  I  am  a  fool  if  I  am 
not  moral.  If  an  altruistic  course  of  con- 
duct will  make  me  happier  than  an  egoistic 
course,  and  I  know  it,  then  I  am  a  fool  if 
I  am  an  egoistic.  But  the  exceptions  are 
very  numerous,  and  men  are  extremely 
willing  to  make  as  many  exceptions  as 


84  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

possible.  When  one  man  kills  another  in 
self-defense,  it  may  be  said  that  his  con- 
duct is  altruistic,  because  society  is  bene- 
fited by  it ;  but  it  is  not  supposed  to  be  in 
accordance  with  the  highest  morality  for  a 
man  to  kill  his  wife's  seducer,  who  takes 
what  is  of  more  value  than  life.  Society 
excuses  me  if  I  slay  the  highway  robber, 
but  is  not  so  lenient  if  I  pursue  beyond 
the  law  the  dishonest  bank  officer  who 
robs  me  of  my  property.  Whether  soci- 
ety is  right  or  wrong,  it  is  not  necessary 
for  our  argument  that  we  should  deter- 
mine. But  it  is  very  clear  that  altruism 
and  morality  are  not  always  coincident. 

The  ideal  way  of  applying  a  moral  code 
is  to  be  found  in  the  Catholic  theory  of 
spiritual  direction,  although,  unhappily,  it 
is  not  practically  justifiable.  The  rules  of 
morality  are  laid  down,  for  example,  by 
the  church.  They  are  sufficient  for  the 
general  guidance  of  conduct.  When  a  dif- 
ficulty occurs  to  any  one  of  the  faithful  he 
goes  to  the  confessional  for  an  interpre- 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  85 

tation  of  the  moral  law,  just  as  we  go  to 
the  physician  for  advice  when  observance 
of  ordinary  physiological  laws  is  insuffi- 
cient to  preserve  our  health ;  and  the  sac- 
erdotal authority  in  settling  the  question 
is  derived  from  the  same  source  as  the 
moral  law.  I  will  not  run  the  risk  of  criti- 
cising this  religious  position  and  possibly 
giving  offense  to  those  who  find  in  the 
confessional  a  source  of  consolation.  It 
is  a  system  which  works  admirably  in  spe- 
cial cases,  and  the  inviolate  secrecy  which 
is  its  safeguard  as  well  as  its  danger  has 
been  remarkably  preserved  in  the  Latin 
church.  Unhappily  there  are  many  men 
in  the  sacred  office  of  priests  who  are  as 
unable  to  deal  with  ethical  difficulties  as 
those  who  come  to  them  for  ghostly  coun- 
sel. My  impression  is  that  those  who 
adopt  the  altruistic  theory  are  not  disposed 
to  follow  the  decrees  of  Rome.  But  many 
of  them  are  equally  unfaithful  to  their  own 
creed. 

Another  form  of  the  difficulty  just  sug- 


86  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

gested  comes  from  the  limited  sphere  of 
human  action.  The  essence  of  altruistic 
morality  is  to  be  found  in  conduct  which 
promotes  the  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number ;  but  one  can  act  only 
with  reference  to  individuals.  While  I  am 
seeking  to  further  the  happiness  of  those 
in  my  immediate  neighborhood,  I  may  be 
seriously  endangering  the  welfare  of  soci- 
ety. Society,  it  is  true,  protects  itself 
against  such  a  danger  by  its  laws  and  cus- 
toms ;  but  what  will  further  the  happiness 
of  society  as  a  whole  must  be  declared  by 
society  itself.  There  arises  thus  the  dan- 
ger of  socialism  as  a  result  of  such  altru- 
ism ;  for  it  follows  that  in  proportion  as 
society  collectively  consults  its  own  hap- 
piness, it  will  so  far  limit  the  action  of  a 
great  number  of  individuals,  not  by  the 
general  laws  which  at  present  prevail,  but 
by  interference  with  the  most  petty  details 
of  human  conduct.  The  result  will  be  a 
revolt  of  society  as  individuals  against  the 
social  organism,  and  men  will  rebel  against 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  87 

their  own  decrees.  Mere  benevolence  and 
sympathy  carried  out  into  action  will  not 
necessarily  promote  the  happiness  of  others. 
This  century  has  shown,  by  the  lament- 
able failure  of  many  well-meant  philan- 
thropic schemes,  how  widely  men's  ideas 
as  to  happiness  differ.  For  example,  a 
benevolent  padrone  might  be  a  greater 
moral  reformer  for  an  Italian  colony  in 
New  York  than  many  men  of  wealth  and 
position  who  had  high  ideas  of  tenement- 
house  improvement  and  of  raising  the  con- 
dition of  the  poor.  But  the  altruist  may 
say,  "  Rome  was  not  built  in  a  day,"  and 
in  time  proper  ways  of  promoting  the  hap- 
piness of  society  will  be  forthcoming.  It 
must  be  confessed  that  there  is  a  hopeful 
view  of  evolution,  —  an  evolution  like  that 
described  by  Lessing,  which  is  the  unfold- 
ing of  God  in  history  for  the  moral  educa- 
tion of  men.  There  is  an  optimism  in 
some  of  our  English  theories  of  evolution 
which  finds  its  idol  in  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury as  the  philosophers  of  the  French  Rev- 


88  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

olution  found  their  idol  in  the  eighteenth. 
There  is  an  optimism  in  the  theory  of  evo- 
lution which  makes  the  progress  of  the  race 
the  progress  of  a  divine  plan,  with  a  glori- 
ous goal  in  the  future.  But  there  is  a 
view  of  evolution  which  is  atheistic,  which 
finds  no  final  cause  (Zweck)  in  the  prog- 
ress of  events.  With  materialistic  ethics, 
it  finds  a  civilization  built  on  ruins,  and  in 
the  uniformity  of  nature  can  recognize 
only  the  prospect  of  a  condition  little  bet- 
ter than  that  of  the  present  or  of  a  future 
dissolution.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
the  rules  of  morality  which  are  at  present 
prevalent  in  Europe  and  America,  with 
respect  to  person  and  property,  are  not  all 
the  result  of  generalizations  as  to  happi- 
ness. Our  moral  code  rests  very  consider- 
ably on  the  code  of  dogmatic  religion,  and 
our  views  of  happiness  have  been  modified 
accordingly.  I  am  ready  to  admit,  for  the 
sake  of  argument,  that  the  problem  of  hap- 
piness is  soluble  by  the  progress  of  experi- 
ence. But  the  question  is,  What  shall  be 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  89 

done  in  the  mean  time  ?  We  may  give  the 
various  answers  once  again  :  Act  for  the 
happiness  of  others,  or  act  for  your  own 
happiness,  and  in  time  the  standard  of 
happiness  will  be  definitely  determined. 
Even  were  this  hopeful  result  probable,  we 
should  be  in  the  presence  of  another  diffi- 
culty, which  seems  to  me  disastrous  to  any 
purely  rational  system  of  ethics. 

2.  It  is  when  the  motives  to  moral  con- 
duct are  considered  that  the  various  meth- 
ods of  ethics  may  be  estimated  most  prac- 
tically. As  has  already  been  said,  even 
were  the  content  of  the  moral  judgment 
given  either  a  priori  or  a  posteriori,  the 
natural  question  is,  Why  should  one  be 
moral?  And  it  is  at  this  point  that  one 
of  the  greatest  difficulties  arises. 

If  we  take  first  the  altruistic  standard, 
we  lay  down  the  law  that  moral  conduct  is 
conduct  which  promotes  the  general  hap- 
piness. It  is  our  duty  to  further  the  wel- 
fare of  the  social  organism.  But  why  ? 
If  we  say,  because  it  is  right,  we  found 


go  A  Theory  of  Ccnduct. 

our  altruistic  maxim  on  a  principle  which 
is  more  ultimate  than  that  of  altruism.  If 
we  say,  because  you  are  naturally  benevo- 
lent and  have  social  instincts,  there  is  no 
need  of  a  moral  code  at  all,  or  else  the 
code  cannot  have  any  power  with  those  to 
whom  self-interest  is  of  more  importance 
than  benevolence  or  sympathy. 

But  we  may  say  we  should  seek  the  hap- 
piness of  others  as  the  best  way  of  secur- 
ing our  own  happiness.  Altruism  in  this 
case  is  only  a  form  of  Egoism.  It  has 
been  justly  observed  by  a  contemporary 
writer  in  Germany  that  utilitarianism  gives 
us  the  art,  but  not  the  science,  of  conduct. 
It  is  as  if  we  were  to  lay  down  the  golden 
rule  as  a  maxim  of  morality,  without  giv- 
ing reasons  why  it  should  be  obeyed.  Un- 
less there  is  some  other  than  a  sentimental 
reason  why  we  should  seek  to  promote  the 
happiness  of  others,  it  would  be  extremely 
foolish  in  a  man  to  sacrifice  his  interests 
to  those  of  others.  One  will  lay  down  his 
life  and  sacrifice  almost  everything  for 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  gi 

the  sake  of  those  whom  one  loves ;  but 
there  are  very  few  whose  love  for  the 
social  organism  is  so  great  as  to  submit 
without  question  or  reason  to  the  demands 
of  society  alone,  especially  when  those  de- 
mands interfere  seriously  with  one's  hap- 
piness. 

Egoism  is  a  far  more  logical  theory  of 
conduct.  It  is  needless  to  explain  why  a 
man  wishes  his  own  happiness.  Altruism, 
therefore,  is  only  a  form  of  egoism.  It 
is  an  excellent  prescription  for  happiness, 
and  forms  a  sound  principle  of  legislation 
as  well  as  of  personal  conduct.  But  if  I 
am  only  to  act  for  the  good  of  others  for 
the  sake  of  self-interest,  it  is  conceivable 
that  occasions  may  arise  where  what  in 
my  judgment  is  for  my  own  interest  is  in 
conflict  with  the  interests  of  others.  Is 
it  proper,  then,  that  I  should  trust  so  far 
to  the  altruistic  principle  as  to  act  in  op- 
position to  what  I  believe  will  promote  my 
own  happiness  ?  A  logical  utilitarian  would 
answer  in  the  affirmative,  for  he  would  say 


92  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

that  the  experience  of  mankind  as  to  the 
means  of  happiness  is  superior  to  your  indi- 
vidual judgment.  If,  however,  I  am  willing 
to  give  up  my  altruism  for  the  occasion, 
there  is  no  ethical  reason  which  can  be 
urged  against  my  decision.  The  only  criti- 
cism of  my  conduct  can  be  :  It  is  unwise  to 
put  your  own  judgment  in  opposition  to  the 
general  theory.  The  altruism  with  which 
one  sets  out  must  in  many  cases  be  given 
up  for  egoism.  Admitting  that  the  altru- 
istic theory  is  the  best,  if  I  follow  it  from 
egoistic  motives,  I  must  logically  become 
an  egoist.  It  is  the  happiness  of  self  which 
must  be  secured  at  any  cost ;  and,  practi- 
cally, the  man  who  helps  others  only  to 
promote  his  own  happiness  is  not  morally 
better  than  the  man  who  acts  for  himself 
alone. 

The  egoistic  method,  however,  is  seri- 
ously defective.  It  is  very  plainly  shown 
by  the  experience  of  the  race  that  to  pur- 
sue happiness  as  an  end  of  conduct  is  to 
encounter  failure.  To  make  happiness  the 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  g$ 

object  of  life  is  almost  certain  to  result  in 
unhappiness,  and  the  logical  result  of  ego- 
istic hedonism  is  pessimism.  There  are 
many  men  born  with  a  good  character,  and 
brought  up  in  the  midst  of  favorable  con- 
ditions, whose  pleasure  is  to  be  useful,  and 
whose  idea  of  happiness  is  unselfish,  —  the 
contemplation  of  the  welfare  of  others ; 
but  these  are  exceptions.  Preach  egoism 
to  the  virtuous  man  and  you  will  have  but 
little  to  fear  of  the  result.  Preach  egoism 
to  the  great  multitude  who  "grunt  and 
sweat  under  a  weary  life,"  whose  physical 
organism  is  controlling,  or  at  any  rate  in- 
fluencing considerably,  their  mental  dis- 
position, who  are  without  what  we  call  the 
nobler  instincts,  and  only  the  chastening 
influence  of  law,  with  its  penalties,  will 
prevent  society  from  degradation.  The 
philanthropic  person  may  be  safely  trusted 
to  follow  his  darling  plan.  The  aesthetic 
dilettante  may  do  no  harm,  even  if  he  does 
but  little  good.  Those  who  are  "  sicklied 
o'er  with  the  pale  cast  of  thought "  may 


94  d  Theory  of  Conduct. 

find  their  pleasure  in  admirable  pursuits. 
But,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  the  egoistic 
motive  is  that  which  corrupts  our  society. 
The  mass  of  men,  if  their  motives  be  self- 
ish, will  pursue  a  course  of  conduct  which 
will  be  certain  to  end  in  unhappiness.  It 
is  not  necessary  for  me  to  dwell  upon  this 
familiar  theme.  History  is  read  to  but 
little  purpose  if  the  career  of  the  Epicure- 
ans at  Rome  and  of  the  sensualists  in  the 
Paris  of  the  eighteenth  century  do  not  pre- 
sent a  living  illustration  of  the  results  of 
this  narrow  hedonism.  It  will  be  said 
that  the  appreciation  of  this  fact  by  re- 
peated sad  experiences  will  correct  the 
natural  impulse  to  excessive  pleasure  and 
its  consequent  pain.  But  it  is  to  be  feared 
that  the  human  race  becomes  but  little 
wiser  as  it  grows  older.  One  might  sup- 
pose, for  example,  that  an  intelligent  knowl- 
edge of  the  doctrine  of  chances  would  pre- 
vent men  from  staking  their  money  on  a 
losing  game,  especially  when  experience 
has  demonstrated  that  the  odds  are  against 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  g$ 

them.  But  there  are  always  multitudes  to 
be  found  who  rely  upon  the  possibility  of 
an  improbable  event.  In  the  same  way, 
in  spite  of  experience  and  of  the  warning 
given  by  others,  there  are  multitudes  who 
willingly  take  the  chances  of  a  painful  se- 
quel to  a  life  of  pleasure..  And  if  to  be 
moral  is  to  seek  after  happiness,  there  is 
no  reason  why  any  moral  blame  should  be 
attached  to  the  drunkard  or  libertine  by 
an  egoistic  hedonist.  This  we  shall  find 
to  be  especially  the  case  if  a  belief  in  im- 
mortality be  given  up.  Any  day  or  hour 
may  end  my  existence,  and  I  cannot  afford 
to  leave  any  pleasure  untouched  which  lies 
within  my  reach.  It  seems  to  me,  then,  that 
from  a  purely  scientific  point  of  view,  ego- 
ism is  the  only  logical  course  of  conduct, 
and  pessimism  is  its  natural  result.  It  is 
idle  to  say  that  such  a  course  can  be  reg- 
ulated by  law.  The  only  reason  why  we 
have  laws  which  limit  the  egoist  in  the 
pursuit  of  happiness  is  that  there  is  leaven 
in  society  which  is  not  egoistic.  Society 


g6  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

will  not  tolerate  such  a  method ;  and  his- 
tory shows  that  where  society  has  followed 
an  egoistic  theory  of  morals,  it  has  speedily 
become  impotent  to  preserve  its  decaying 
life  by  any  legal  sanctions.  If  murder  is 
avoided  only  through  fear  of  the  gallows 
or  of  prison,  society  will  soon  do  away 
with  the  gallows  and  the  prison.  If  crimes 
against  the  purity  of  women  are  avoided 
only  from  physiological  or  pathological 
causes,  then  there  will  be  but  little  purity 
left  at  the  mercy  of  those  who  wish  to 
sin.  If  property  be  respected  only  through 
fears  of  legal  process,  society  is  not  likely 
to  tolerate  such  an  institution  as  property. 
From  a  scientific  point  of  view,  I  fail  alto- 
gether to  see  what  duty  I  owe  to  the  social 
organism,  about  which  one  hears  and  reads 
so  much.  My  own  happiness  is  of  far 
greater  importance  to  me  than  this  con- 
glomerate of  individual  men,  most  of  whom 
are  nothing  to  me.  A  philanthropy  which 
is  pursued  at  the  expense  of  the  happiness 
of  the  philanthropist  is,  it  seems  to  me, 
the  height  of  folly. 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  97 

It  is  at  this  very  point  that  the  inquirer 
is  confronted  by  the  great  religions  of  the 
world  with  their  ethical  power.  This  eth- 
ical power  is  twofold.  It  consists  in  a  con- 
stant moral  code  and  the  presentation  of 
an  efficient  motive.  The  general  theory 
of  right,  of  duty,  and  of  character  which  I 
have  suggested  is  not  inconsistent  with 
any  of  the  prevailing  systems  of  religion. 
The  existence  of  the  idea  of  duty  can  best 
be  explained  by  affirming  the  existence  of 
a  God,  who  is  the  author  of  right.  The 
revelation  of  the  will  of  God  furnishes  the 
material  of  the  moral  judgment.  This  is 
especially  true  in  the  case  of  the  Christian 
religion.  If  there  be  a  moral  code  which 
it  is  our  duty  to  follow,  the  question  then 
arises,  How  can  a  man  whose  character  is 
immoral,  who  is  brought  up  amid  immoral 
surroundings,  be  led  to  obey  the  moral 
law  ?  From  a  purely  scientific  point  of 
view,  there  is  no  satisfactory  answer  to  the 
question.  The  maxims  of  morality  may  be 
presented  to  such  a  man,  and  yet  there 


9<S  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

will  be  no  motive  to  insure  his  obedience. 
The  scientific  doctrine  that  hereditary  in- 
fluences may  produce  a  character  with  bad 
tendencies  finds  its  theological  counter- 
part in  the  Augustinian  doctrine  of  orig- 
inal sin.  The  problem  is  to  make  moral 
conduct  desirable ;  and,  so  long  as  the 
character  is  bad  and  the  motives  insuffi- 
cient, obedience  to  moral  law  cannot  read- 
ily be  secured.  It  is  true  that  if  all  mo- 
rality results  in  happiness,  a  man  in  the 
pursuit  of  happiness  may  often  attain  to 
morality.  It  is  in  this  way  that  non-reli- 
gious systems  of  ethics  have  arisen.  But 
every  moral  reformer  knows  that  maxims 
and  advice  may  be  absolutely  ineffective 
in  inducing  men  to  lead  moral  lives,  — just 
as  every  clergyman  knows  that  the  most 
persuasive  preaching  may  fail  to  convince 
even  those  whose  characters  are  not  alto- 
gether bad.  The  Christian  solution  of  the 
problem  is  very  simple ;  and  the  results  of 
the  Christian  system,  judged  empirically, 
have  been  extraordinary.  Christianity 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  99 

maintains  that  the  character  acquires  a 
good  tendency  through  supernatural  influ- 
ence, so  that  in  what  is  called  by  theolo- 
gians regeneration,  or  the  new  birth,  the 
soul  receives  an  impulse  by  the  action  of 
God  himself.  The  result  is  that  what  once 
seemed  undesirable  to  the  man  of  bad 
character  now  seems  desirable,  and  the 
immoral  ideal  is  exchanged  for  an  ideal  of 
moral  perfection — a  likeness  to  the  source 
of  right.  The  Christian  religion  explains 
this  regeneration  of  character  by  maintain- 
ing that  God,  although  hating  sin,  has 
personally  loved  the  sinner,  and,  in  the 
revelation  of  himself  in  the  person  of 
Jesus  Christ,  has  made  it  possible  for  men 
to  be  moral  and  so  attain  to  happiness.  I 
am  aware  that  the  above  statement  of 
Christian  teaching  may  be  criticised  for 
its  vagueness,  and  must  be  modified  ac- 
cording to  various  particular  creeds.  But 
whatever  the  specific  form  of  Christianity 
may  be,  the  important  point  is  that  love  to 
God,  as  revealed  in  Christ,  is  the  motive 


wo  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

of  obedience  to  the  moral  law.  What  mo- 
rality is,  is  determined  empirically  by  refer- 
ring to  God's  revealed  will.  Why  one 
should  be  moral  is  determined  by  the  in- 
fluence of  God  on  the  human  character, 
which  makes  conduct  coincide  with  the 
will  of  God  because  of  love  toward  God. 
This  is  evidently  a  subject  lying  outside 
the  limits  of  scientific  method.  But  I  am 
far  from  believing  that  the  negative  results 
reached  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  book 
destroy  the  apologetical  value  of  ethics. 
At  the  same  time  it  would  seem  that 
Christianity  is  of  vast  apologetic  impor- 
tance to  any  practicable  system  of  ethics. 
One  may  make  a  broader  statement,  and 
say  that  ethics  without  religion  is  a  body 
without  life.  Instead  of  affirming  with 
Mr.  Matthew  Arnold,  then,  that  religion 
is  "morality  touched  with  emotion,"  I 
should  prefer  to  say  that  morality  without 
religion  is  without  its  most  important  ele- 
ment. It  has  been  often  observed  that 
the  Christian  religion,  by  its  exaltation  of 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  101 

what  is  called  self-denial,  is  directly  op- 
posed to  the  systems  of  the  Greek  and  Ro- 
man world.  But  it  has  been  shown  that,  in 
it,  aside  from  the  question  of  its  truth  or  fal- 
sity, are  to  be  found  those  elements  which 
bind  it  to  the  feelings  of  the  world.  The 
doctrine  of  the  Incarnation  brings  God  in 
direct  personal  relation  to  the  sympathies 
of  every  human  soul.  It  is  in  this  respect 
that  Christianity  holds  a  peculiar  position 
as  an  ethical  power,  in  spite  of  its  strin- 
gent moral  code  and  its  somewhat  pessi- 
mistic view  of  the  prevalence  and  power  of 
evil.  It  is  often  compared  with  the  other 
great  religions  of  the  world,  such  as  Brah- 
minism,  Buddhism,  and  Mohammedanism. 
But  these  noble  or  seductive  creeds  have 
found  no  God  in  a  manger.  Their  divin- 
ity has  never  been  despised  and  bleeding. 
From  the  heads  of  those  who  are  its  dei- 
ties no  crown  of  thorns  has  drawn  the 
blood  of  our  humanity,  which  is  so  weak 
and  weary.  We  find  no  cross,  nor  cruel 
nails,  nor  soldier's  spear.  Their  sepulchres 


IO2  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

are  not  empty.  A  strange  and  wild  fanat- 
icism, an  eternal  and  hopeless  annihilation, 
or  a  throng  of  beckoning  harlots  supply 
the  place  of  a  Redeemer's  advocacy  and 
those  influences  which  suggest  a  life  of 
peace.  The  form  of 'the  moral  judgment 
is  common  to  all,  but  its  material  content, 
as  presented  by  Christianity,  urges  upon 
the  reluctant  mind  the  power  of  an  end- 
less life  as  a  motive,  and  the  will  becomes 
the  servant  of  the  author  of  right  and  of  the 
rewarder  of  morality.  And  so  this  power 
is  illustrated  most  conspicuously  in  the 
conduct  of  many  who  profess  to  hold  this 
relationship  to  God.  There  are  not  a  few  a 
part  of  whose  lives  has  been  one  long,  studi- 
ous attempt  to  seek  pleasure  at  the  sacri- 
fice of  virtue,  but  who  have  given  up  every- 
thing for  the  sake  of  God.  In  the  mind  of 
many  a  man,  hidden  altogether  from  the 
sight  of  others,  the  conflict  between  duty 
and  desire  has  been  waged  as  in  the  old 
Greek  tragedies,  and  victory  has  been 
gained  by  the  change  of  character,  so  that 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  103 

the  sacrifice  of  that  which  was  the  object 
of  one's  life  and  love  has  been  made  in  or- 
der that  the  moral  law  might  be  obeyed.  It 
is  these  instances  of  asceticism  in  the  in- 
most part  of  a  man's  soul,  and  this  hidden 
immolation  of  the  dea'rest  part  of  his  life, 
which  are  the  spiritual  counterpart  of  mo- 
nasticism,  —  that  marvelous  effect  of  reli- 
gion,— which,  whether  founded  on  Christi- 
anity or  not,  is  a  most  remarkable  evidence 
of  the  power  of  human  will. 

In  addition  to  this,  it  is  held  by  Chris- 
tians—  at  least,  by  the  majority  of  Chris- 
tians —  that  the  world  is  only  an  arena  of 
moral  conflict  preparatory  to  the  period 
after  death,  when  happiness  or  unhappi- 
ness  await  the  moral  agent  according  to 
his  actions  here.  It  is  impossible,  to  exag- 
gerate the  importance  of  the  doctrine  of 
immortality  in  its  relation  to  ethics,  and 
the  prevalence  of  the  doctrine  among  many 
races  has  been  supposed  by  some  to  point 
to  the  reality  of  a  life  beyond  the  grave. 
It  is  very  difficult  to  account  for  the  exist- 


W4  4  Theory  of  Conduct 

ence  of  belief  in  immortality,  unless  we 
refer  to  Revelation.  So  far  as  science 
teaches  us,  there  is  no  foundation  for  the 
doctrine  except  its  prevalence  and  the  ne- 
cessity of  immortality  as  a  condition  of  ef- 
fective moral  action.  All  the  arguments 
which  have  been  employed  are  either  fan- 
ciful, —  resting  on  metaphysical  miscon- 
ceptions, —  like  the  arguments  of  the 
Phaedo,  or  they  tend  simply  to  show  the 
persistence  of  force.  The  analogical  argu- 
ment of  Bishop  Butler,  for  example,  falls 
far  short  of  making  out  a  case  for  the  be- 
liever in  personal  immortality.  The  ques- 
tion is  not,  Does  death  end  all  ?  Of  course 
death  does  not  end  all.  The  question  is, 
Do  I,  do  you,  survive  the  death  of  the 
body  ?  .And  I  have  yet  to  find  the  science 
which  furnishes  premises  from  which  a 
conclusion  can  be  drawn. 

By  Kant  and  by  other  able  writers  im- 
mortality has  been  regarded  as  a  necessary 
postulate  of  ethics.  Suppose,  for  exam- 
ple, that  a  person  be  told  to  do  what  is 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  105 

right  in  order  to  become  happy.  He  is  in- 
formed that  the  immediate  results  of  his 
difficult  course  of  conduct  will  be  unpleas- 
ant, but  that  self-denial  is  the  means  to  hap- 
piness. Suppose  that  such  an  one  dies  be- 
fore his  happiness  is  attained,  what  be- 
comes of  the  agreement  between  virtue 
and  happiness  ?  Great  fault  has  been  found 
with  certain  forms  of  religion  for  dwelling 
on  the  offer  of  reward  to  virtue.  It  is  held 
that  men  should  not  be  bought  to  do  right, 
but  should  do  what  is  right  for  its  own 
sake,  on  account  of  its  intrinsic  character. 
It  will  be  an  interesting  spectacle  when 
the  code  of  action  is  first  introduced  for 
man's  acceptance  without  the  promise  of 
reward  or  punishment.  Unquestionably  a 
very  large  number  of  men  embrace  the 
Christian  faith  because  they  are  afraid  of 
being  punished  if  they  are  bad,  and  expect 
to  go  to  heaven  if  they  are  good  ;  but  the 
more  this  idea  is  rooted  in  their  minds  the 
stronger  their  feelings  are  to  the  Being 
who  rewards  them.  If  it  is  immoral  to 


io6  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

follow  a  code  of  ethics  for  the  sake  of  the 
reward  of  moral  action,  what  can  be  said 
of  the  morality  of  the  altruist  or  the  ego- 
ist ?  Unless  there  is  a  prospect  of  im- 
mortal reward,  in  many  instances  it  will 
not  seem  worth  the  while  to  be  moral 
where  morality  seems  opposed  to  self-in- 
terest. It  is  at  any  rate  very  evident  that, 
if  there  be  no  immortal  life,  this  world  is 
an  unweeded  garden.  There  is  not  an 
ethical  writer  of  importance  since  the  time 
of  Plato  who  has  not  dwelt  upon  the  pros- 
perity which  often  attends  immoral  con- 
duct. Imprudent  immorality  often  brings 
its  punishment  immediately ;  but  "  the 
wicked  in  great  power  spreading  himself 
like  a  green  bay  tree  "  is  a  spectacle  not 
confined  to  the  .time  of  David.  What  are 
we  to  say  of  the  wrongs  which  are  unre- 
dressed,  of  the  crimes  undiscovered,  of  hy- 
pocrisy which  passes  as  virtue,  and  vice 
which  is  pursued  through  life  to  be  ended 
by  a  painless  death  ?  What  are  we  to  say 
of  the  good  actions  which  go  unrewarded, 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  107 

of  virtues  unnoticed,  of  lives  devoted  to 
morality,  but  hidden  from  public  sight,  and 
often  maimed  and  distorted  by  injury  and 
persecution  ?  The  answer  that  naturally 
comes  is,  There  is  an  immortal  life  beyond 
the  grave,  where  virtue  is  rewarded  and 
vice  receives  its  punishment. 

"  Oh,  yet  we  trust  that,  somehow,  good 
Will  be  the  final  goal  of  ill." 

And  this  is  where  the  Christian,  who  may 
agree  to  many  of  the  propositions  of  the 
pessimist,  takes  a  widely  different  view. 
The  thorny  path,  beyond  which  the  pessi- 
mist does  not  raise  his  eyes,  is  to  the 
Christian  indeed  a  way  to  Calvary  ;  but  at 
the  end  of  the  crooked,  weary  road  he  has 
glimpses  of  unending  rest.  But  there  is 
misery  in  the  world  as  well  as  crime.  The 
prison  walls  do  not  inclose  all  the  crimi- 
nals, and  not  all  those  inclosed  by  prison 
walls  are  criminal.  There  are  many  who 
have  never  heard  of  God,  to  whom  religion 
is  a  sham  and  virtue  only  another  name  for 
vice.  There  are  beside  this  the  wards 


io8  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

of  our  asylums  for  the  insane,  where  the 
mind  is  struggling  to  recover  its  lost  throne. 
The  bare  walls  throw  back  grotesque  or 
awful  images  ;  the  silence  seems  to  be  full 
of  unearthly  sounds  ;  sensation  is  torture ; 
and  life  a  long,  dark  way  without  purpose, 
without  hope,  without  end. 

Is  the  wish,  then,  father  to  the  thought  ? 
Does  not  the  belief  in  immortality  indicate 
that  immortality  is  a  fact  ?  If  every  grave 
is  a  goal  of  life,  then,  when  the  eyes  of  the 
dead  are  closed,  no  face  can  be  raised  to- 
wards immortal  life  with  immortal  hope. 
It  is  the  categorical  statement  of  science 
that  dust,  not  Heaven,  is  our  home.  From 
this  point  of  view  every  funeral  becomes 
•desperate.  We  say  that  "  our  brother  is 
dead,  is  no  more,"  and  science  does  not 
tell  us  that  he  is  asleep  or  that  he  is  in 
Paradise.  The  undertaker  is  the  most  ap- 
propriate clergyman  ;  the  song  of  Jerusa- 
lem the  golden  sounds  discordant  and  false. 
The  Paradise  to  which  we  turn  our  wistful 
eyes  is  only  a  graveyard  or  a  vault.  A 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  109 

few  fading  flowers,  a  few  tears,  a  few  frag- 
ments of  earth,  fall  upon  the  dead.  We 
leave  it  all  under  the  sun,  or  under  the 
stars,  or  under  the  gray  sky,  with  the  wav- 
ing grass  and  nodding  trees  around  it. 
Religion  is  no  longer  ours.  We  go  home 
and  try  to  imagine  that  the  vacant  chair 
is  again  occupied,  that  the  echoes  of  a 
voice  now  silent  still  linger,  and  that  the 
heart  which  once  was  ours  is  here,  and  not 
far  away  under  the  cypresses,  alone  for- 
ever. And  if  the  pessimistic  alternative 
embitters  the  contemplation  of  the  death 
of  others,  it  embitters  also  the  contempla- 
tion of  life  upon  our  own  part. 

If  science  does  not  tell  us  of  immortal- 
ity, if  justice  demands  immortality,  if 
the  only  redress  of  evil  here  is  redemption 
from  evil  and  recompense  hereafter,  and 
if  there  be  a  principle  which  controls  cur 
lives,  pessimism  rises  and  declares  that  its 
thesis  is  proved.  To  the  pessimist  there 
is  a  Being  whom  one  cannot  call  God,  for 


no  A  Theory  of  Conduct. 

God  is  not  a  fiend  There  is  but  one 
world,  and  that  world  is  a  troubled  dream, 
a  hell.  With  such  premises  the  conclusion 
is  inevitable,  and  one  will  be  tempted  to 
say,  I  was  born  in  spite  of  myself.  I  have 
lived,  and  the  world  is  bad.  Behind  me  is 
a  chaos"  of  disappointments.  As  each  day 
dawns  I  find  that  what  I  thought  was  a 
real  good  is  at  best  a  shadow,  is  always  an 
evil.  The  past  is  gone ;  the  present  does 
not  realize  my  expectations  ;  the  future  is 
without  hope.  I  have  danced  long  enough 
to  this  devil's  music  ;  I  have  lived  long 
enough  in  this  tomb.  Why  should  I  en- 
dure this  monotony  and  await  this  pleasure 
which  is  always  expected,  never  realized, 
so  long  as  there  is  a  strong  rope,  a  sharp 
knife,  a  deep  stream,  or  an  active  poison  ? 
Death  is  better;  but  it  is  not  for  me  to 
complete  the  Nunc  dimittis  of  Rabelais. 
"  Let  the  curtain  fall ; "  not  the  farce,  but 
the  tragedy,  is  played. 

It  is  when  Science  is  dumb  that  Religion 


The  Motive  to  Morality.  in 

begins  to  speak ;  and  the  fact  is  suggested 
that  supernatural  light  is  rare,  and  when 
it  shines  on  earth  it  is  not  an  undulation 
of  the  ether,  nor,  indeed,  any  datum  of 
science. 


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